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Abstract
Companies and government organizations are increasingly compelled, if not required by law, to ensure that their information 
systems will comply with various federal and industry regulatory standards, such as the NIST Special Publication on Security 
Controls for Federal Information Systems (NIST SP-800-53), or the Common Criteria (ISO 15408-2). Such organizations 
operate business or mission critical systems where a lack of or lapse in security protections translates to serious confidential-
ity, integrity, and availability risks that, if exploited, could result in information disclosure, loss of money, or, at worst, loss 
of life. To mitigate these risks and ensure that their information systems meet regulatory standards, organizations must be 
able to (a) contextualize regulatory documents in a way that extracts the relevant technical implications for their systems, 
(b) formally represent their systems and demonstrate that they meet the extracted requirements following an accreditation 
process, and (c) ensure that all third-party systems, which may exist outside of the information system enclave as web or cloud 
services also implement appropriate security measures consistent with organizational expectations. This paper introduces 
a step-wise process, based on semantic hierarchies, that systematically extracts relevant security requirements from control 
standards to build a certification baseline for organizations to use in conjunction with formal methods and service agreements 
for accreditation. The approach is demonstrated following a case study of all audit-related controls in the SP-800-53, ISO 
15408-2, and related documents. Accuracy, applicability, consistency, and efficacy of the approach were evaluated using 
controlled qualitative and quantitative methods in two separate studies.
Keywords Security policy · Security requirements · Requirement extraction · Security control standards · Regulatory 
compliance · Certification · Accreditation · Semantic hierarchy
1 Introduction
Laws, regulations, and corporate policies increasingly 
require companies and government organizations to dem-
onstrate that mission or business critical information sys-
tems and IT infrastructures satisfy a set of security policies 
governing user behavior, system behavior, and emergency 
fail-safes. Given the critical nature of these systems, a lack 
or lapse of security protections translates to serious privacy 
and confidentiality risks that, if exploited, could result in 
information disclosure, loss of money, or, at worst, loss of 
life. To mitigate these risks and ensure that their information 
systems meet regulatory standards, organizations must be 
able to (a) contextualize regulatory documents in a way that 
extracts and expresses all of the relevant technical security 
implications for their systems, (b) formally certify that their 
in-house systems meet the extracted requirements, and (c) 
ensure that all integrated third-party systems, which may 
exist outside of the protected information system enclave as 
web services in a cloud, also implement appropriate security 
measures consistent with the regulatory documents. Certifi-
cation practices require expertise in the information system 
domain, as well as understanding the corporate culture and 
organization expectations for security certification. Imple-
mented as information system security controls, the technical 
portion of security policies typically include, at a minimum, 
provisions governing access control, audit, data protection, 
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contingency planning, and non-repudiation [1–5]. Certifi-
cation experts seek to re-use techniques, as evidenced by 
the overlay concepts now highlighted in the NIST 800-53r4 
[2], which designate specific groups of controls, beyond the 
baselines, that can be used for sector or industry applica-
tions such as health care, avionics, or critical infrastructure 
systems.
Occurring in tandem with system development and inte-
gration, the verification step of software system certification 
requires that system developers and security analysts exam-
ine security control documentation to identify all applicable 
security requirements and then extensively test the system 
to determine whether or not it satisfies the requirements 
[6–9]. Currently, examining and contextualizing regula-
tory documents means that developers and security analysts 
must read through, decompose, and interpret long, complex, 
natural language textual security control documents, such as 
the NIST SP-800-53 [2] (for federal information systems), 
the Health Information Portability and Accountability Act 
(HIPAA) (for medical information systems) [10], or the 
Common Criteria (ISO-15408 for industry information sys-
tems) [3] without formal underpinnings [11]. Based on the 
interpreted information, expansive test cases and security 
checklists must then be generated to test all system compo-
nent features [1, 12] and certify that they meet the regulatory 
requirements.
System components may be developed in-house by the 
organization, created specifically for the organization by an 
external organization, deployed as third-party commercial 
off the shelf (COTS) products, or provided as cloud-based 
web services. Any and all information system updates, 
patches, or API (i.e., application programming interface) 
changes that affect the system require organizations to re-
examine security control documentation to determine if 
any security requirements were impacted. With externally 
provided components or third-party cloud web services, re-
certification is particularly difficult, since it is more difficult 
to know how the changes impact the security posture of the 
system. As time goes on, and security controls are repeatedly 
reexamined, test-cases tend to become myopically focused 
on the new features and not the overall picture of the system 
[6]. Verification and certification becomes more and more 
piecemeal, incomplete, and inconsistent with previous sys-
tem iterations.
Achieving a coherent, consistent perspective of techni-
cal security control compliance that is resilient to system 
changes requires coupling a requirement extraction process 
that uniformly expresses and organizes security require-
ments with formal techniques for representing information 
systems so that security concerns can be partitioned without 
fear of myopia—since all of the direct and indirect rela-
tionships are understood between component features and 
compliance requirements. Embedding both resilience and 
formalization into the Risk Management Framework [13] 
can enable clearer certification processes during system 
extensions, continuous monitoring that may identify new 
risks, and new application development. Capturing trace-
ability information about how certification was performed 
can lead to less ambiguity and, instead, point more directly 
to security controls affected by extension and new emerging 
risks. For new development, certifiers rely on prior experi-
ence (themselves or initial consulting services) and earlier 
organization documents for certification of other informa-
tion systems. Common controls defined for the organization 
or overlays of controls defined for the information system 
domain that have explicit formal specification and interre-
lationships with other controls provide this immediate trace-
ability and direct application as new development proceeds. 
This paper introduces a step-wise pattern-based require-
ment extraction and formalization approach that produces 
a compliance model that formally represents the security 
compliance requirements embedded in an arbitrary group 
of security controls selected by organizational security poli-
cies as a set of compliance predicates divided into security 
control semantic hierarchies.
Forming a hierarchy begins by examining an organiza-
tion’s security profile. The profile dictates which technical 
security controls the organization’s information systems 
must comply with. Each control states one or more func-
tional security requirements, i.e., the organization, system, 
or component in the system must do something or have a 
certain property. Understanding how security requirements 
mandate compliance requirements requires the ability to 
identify key information in the security requirements that 
must be verified. To do this, our model includes a set of 
security governance patterns capable of extracting and 
organizing control information. The governance patterns are 
predicated on the understanding that security controls have 
similar semantics despite having disparate representations, 
formats, and groupings across documents.
After the security controls are extracted using the gov-
ernance patterns, a formal schema is used to map extracted 
control content into formal constructs that uniformly rep-
resents information based on the type of pattern used. This 
step produces compliance requirements that dictate con-
straints that information systems must follow. Examining 
such requirements in isolation is not sufficient. Thus, in 
addition to the governance patterns and formal schema, we 
define a set of semantic relations capable of relating similar 
compliance requirements together. Semantic relations allow 
control compliance constraints to be properly placed in rela-
tion to compliance requirements from other security con-
trols. Figure 1 demonstrates how this trifecta, i.e., patterns, 
schema, and relations, allows regulatory requirements to be 
extracted, formalized, and grouped into semantic control 
hierarchies that unambiguously defines a set of compliance 
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predicates that completely represent organizational compli-
ance burdens.
At the root of each control hierarchy is a single compli-
ance predicate that expresses the functional security con-
straints of a collection of security controls that semantically 
appear below it. Children of the root may add structure, 
specificity, and parameters to the constraints in the predicate. 
Selecting a compliance predicate to be part of an informa-
tion system’s security profile means that a verifier can trav-
erse the associated hierarchy, through the semantic links, to 
determine what branches should be verified to demonstrate 
compliance. Each hierarchy may encompass controls from 
other different control families, as well as other governing 
documents. Thus, the verification step for one document can 
show compliance with constraints in other documents. In 
addition, as common control groups are established for an 
organization’s information systems and as overlays are des-
ignated for certain domains, the semantic links can point to 
controls that have strong interrelationships with controls in 
the common or overlay groups but may have been inadvert-
ently omitted.
The compliance modeling process reduces the burden 
security certification by formulating compliance predicates 
as logical expressions that represent underlying security 
policy requirements in ways that are amenable to verifica-
tion, can be contextualized for a particular organization, 
and can easily be used by other organizations following the 
same regulatory standard. The process also makes explicit 
all of the connections between disparate compliance predi-
cates, so that there is no question as to what must be re-
certified when a system component is patched or changed 
by the organization or a third-party vendor. This rest of 
this paper uses a running audit case study based on the 
entire set of technical security controls relating to audit, 
taken from the SP-800-53 [2], the Common Criteria-Part 
2 [3], and other regulatory standards including the DoD 
8500.2 [4] and its companion Application Security and 
Development STIG [5]. This case study illustrates the deri-
vation and application of the compliance model.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Sect. 2 
overviews relevant regulatory documents, the accredita-
tion tooling ecosystem around them, security requirement 
extraction techniques, and formal methods that can be used 
in conjunction with the compliance model for system cer-
tification. Section 3 details the three types of governance 
patterns and formalization templates used for requirement 
extraction and formalization. Section 4 defines the five 
semantic relations necessary to relate formalized com-
pliance predicates. Section 5 brings the audit case study 
together, defining every audit-centric compliance predicate 
in the family of regulatory standards previously identi-
fied. Section 6 describes the methodology and results of 
two complementary studies with academic and industry 
compliance experts conducted to evaluate the approach. 
Finally, Sect.  7 concludes the work by discussing the 
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implications and applicability of this approach within the 
certification and accreditation tooling landscape.
2  Background
Underlying holistic security certification is the notion of 
managing compliance over the life cycle of organizational 
information systems by implementing and managing certain 
security measures to mitigate vulnerabilities and, thus, limit 
risk. Based on the Risk Management Lifecycle and Security 
Allocation Control processes in [2, 13], an internal certi-
fication lifecycle [14] is depicted in Fig. 2 that describes 
the security lifecycle of internally managed organizational 
systems, i.e., traditional systems without cloud web service 
components. The lifecycle begins when the organization 
defines a security policy. A security policy [2, 9] is a high-
level document that addresses organizational security goals 
as a series of abstract, but ideally, unambiguous goal state-
ments, e.g., user data will remain confidential or systems 
will remain operational 99% of the time. These goal state-
ments then direct the selection of security controls, as shown 
in Fig. 2, from the set of security controls provided by a 
chosen regulatory standard (discussed in detail in Sect. 2.1). 
Once selected, the controls govern the design of the system, 
as the organization must implement the controls on top of 
their system functionality.
After (and during) the system design process, vulnerabili-
ties must be assessed and mitigated in order for the security 
controls to be satisfied and, thus, for the organization to be 
in compliance with the regulatory standard. Resources such 
as the Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) [15] and 
the Common Vulnerability Enumeration (CVE) [16] may 
be used to direct the assessment and mitigation of identified 
implementation issues. The end result of successful certifi-
cation is the formation of a secure system enclave [2] around 
the data and functionality that the system contains in a way 
that complies with the regulatory mandates and protects 
critical information or infrastructure.
Organizations utilizing third-party cloud services as part 
of their information system processing must follow a differ-
ent certification lifecycle [14], as introduced in Fig. 3. This 
lifecycle may be applicable for any outsourced service, but 
our focus is on the expected use of cloud services over which 
the organization has some control. In this process, the organ-
izations are not implementing the system design. Instead 
they are seeking services that perform certain functions, but 
that implement organizationally selected security controls. 
In this way, an organization’s choice of security controls 
direct the formation of a service request. The request could 
be for one or many web services. Once formed, the request 
must be assessed to determine what types of vulnerabili-
ties might apply to it, e.g., vulnerabilities described in [15, 
16]. For instance, a service request for web composition of 
cloud storage services with a point of sale system might 
have the potential for data disclosure at the interchange 
points. By identifying these vulnerabilities, the organiza-
tion can construct a risk-weighted list of service terms [14] 
that any prospective service providers must be able to meet. 
A matchmaking algorithm may then be applied to examine 
the risk-weighted service request against actual published 
service provider risk terms and select the service provider 
with the closest match, i.e., lowest risk of non-compliance.
For many organizations the reality is often somewhere in 
between these two lifecycle views. Such organizations may 
utilize cloud-based web services combined with traditional 
in-house systems that form a hybrid system [17]. In all cases, 
it is important that security controls are well defined and 
unambiguous so that certification is consistent and repeat-
able [2] regardless of whether the operational environ-
ment is in the cloud or an in-house information technology 
(IT) asset. The next sections discuss governing regulatory 
documents (Sect. 2.1), the state of the art in requirements 
extraction and modeling (Sect. 2.2), and formal modeling 
Fig. 2  Internal system certifica-
tion lifecycle
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approaches for representing traditional and cloud-based sys-
tems (Sect. 2.3).
2.1  Federal and industry regulatory documents
Organizations with critical systems, such as government 
agencies, hospitals, corporations, or military branches, 
typically follow one or more federal or industry regulatory 
standards to ensure their systems meet confidentiality, integ-
rity, and availability constraints. These regulatory stand-
ards include the NIST Recommended Security Controls 
for Federal Information Systems and Organizations (NIST 
SP-800-53) [2], Department of Defense Instruction 8500.2: 
Information Assurance (IA) Implementation (DoDI 8500.2) 
[4], and its companion document the Defense Information 
Systems Agency’s Application Security and Development 
Security Technical Implementation Guide (DISA-AppStig) 
[5] (for federal information systems), the Health Information 
Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) (for medical 
information systems) [10], and the Common Criteria (ISO-
15408) [3] and Cloud Computing Matrix [18] (for industry 
information systems). All of these documents are directly 
addressed in our approach with the exception of HIPAA, 
which has been the focus of a number of other research 
initiatives including widely accepted work by Breaux and 
Anton [19], discussed in Sect. 2.2.
The gold standard for federal information systems is the 
NIST SP800-53 [2]. The SP800-53 structures its security 
controls using a well-defined three level system. At the top 
is the control family. Each family describes either a set of 
controls that are technical (impacts system design), manage-
ment (governs organizational planning, risk assessment and 
authorization), or operational (relates to personnel training, 
physical configuration and security, incident response, etc.). 
There are a total of 18 high-level families that include provi-
sions for audit, access control, and contingency planning. 
Below the high-level family are individually numbered and 
named security controls that describe particular security 
requirements. Finally, the bottom level is comprised of con-
trol enhancements that decompose the control into particu-
lar facets of interest and generally expand on the security 
control content.
The DoDI 8500.2 [4] is an older federal standard, on 
which the Department of Defense Information Assurance 
Certification and Accreditation Process (DIACAP) [1] is 
based. The DoDI 8500.2 is much less structured than the 
SP800-53 and has much less concrete control statements. 
Each information assurance control in the DoDI 8500.2 has 
a unique control number and is grouped into one of several 
possible subject areas. Each control has three versions, one 
for each of the mission assurance categories which describe 
the level of mission criticality applicable to the control. 
STIGs, or security technical implementation guidelines, 
specifically the 2011 Application Security and Development 
STIG [5], extend the DoDI 8500.2, reducing the abstraction 
of control statements by filling in details such as stating the 
type of encryption required, or specifying the structure or 
type of events that must be audited. A hodgepodge of other 
documents, including the DoDI 5200.2, 5200.40, 8500.1, 
OMB-Circular A-1-130 [20–23], relate to the DoDI 8500.2, 
but are either to high level [22, 23], non-technical [20], or 
outdated [21] and are thus not applicable to our work. For 
instance, the DoDI 5200.2 [20] is a non-technical docu-
ment describing the DoD recommendations for personnel 
security programs, and OMB A-130 [23] and DoDI 8500.1 
[22] describe the roles of executive departments and agency 
heads and high-level policy requirements, respectively.
The Common Criteria for Information Technology 
Security Evaluation, hitherto labeled Common Criteria or 
simply CC, contains three parts [24]. Part 1 describes the 
general model taken by the CC and defines relevant termi-
nology [24]. Part 2 [3] defines a set of Security Functional 
Fig. 3  External cloud-based 
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Requirements that resemble the security controls defined in 
the SP800-53. Parts 3 [25] focuses on Security Assurance 
Requirements and the methodology that must be used for 
evaluating IT security. Our work focuses explicitly on Part 
2, designated as ISO-15408 or simply referred to as CC-
Part2 in this paper, as it describes the security requirements 
organizations must follow. The CC-Part2 follows a three 
level structure, like the SP800-53, but is organized using a 
component-based format. At the top is the functional class 
which describes the category, such as security audit. Next 
are a set of functional families that denote general security 
requirements, e.g., the need for audit storage protection. 
Below each of these are one or more components which 
describe particular details of the security requirement and 
may be hierarchical to each other.
2.2  Security requirement extraction and modeling
Before discussing how security requirements can be 
extracted and modeled, it is important to define certain ter-
minology in order to proceed with a common vernacular. 
Foundational work by Haley et al. [26, 27] provides a formal 
treatise on the security requirements engineering process 
and complements the NIST security life cycle [2, 13]. Haley 
defines requirements in terms of security goals and threats 
to identified assets. Assets are “objects with a direct or indi-
rect value” [27] which if lost would incur some harm. A 
threat description describes the harm caused if an action 
is performed on an asset. Security goals are threat descrip-
tions prefaced with “prevent.” Finally, security requirements 
are operationalized security goals that constrain the system 
design to prevent or reduce possibly harms to the set of iden-
tified assets. The NIST SP800-53, like the CC, defines secu-
rity controls [2, 3] as “safeguards” or “countermeasures” 
that when implemented, provide a “level of security due 
diligence” for organizations. Contrasting this definition with 
Haley’s, we can say that security controls contain one or 
more security requirements that constrain system design to 
prevent harm to identified assets, i.e., they fulfill the security 
goals of the organization.
In addition to this defined core terminology, the security 
requirements extraction process produces context-specific 
terminology [2], such as what the definition of an auditable 
event is or what organizational parameters mean. Ontolo-
gies [28–33] are typically used to organize and structure 
context-specific terminology, which helps security analysts 
to classify and reason over security controls in regulatory 
documents. Ontologies, at their core, consist of a set of 
entities [34] that represent concrete concepts, or types of 
things, and a set of relations [34] that connect disparate 
concepts. For instance, a few entities might be John Len-
non, Person, Beatles. These entities could be related together 
using common ontological relationships like is_a or part_of, 
e.g., John Lennon is_a Person who is part_of the Beatles. 
Applications of ontologies to the security lifecycle include 
assisting organizations in the security control selection and 
design-time software engineering process [33, 35], provid-
ing support during the policy decision making process [36], 
enabling run-time adaptations (such as web service replace-
ment) [37], and providing the building blocks for structuring 
regulatory terms and controls [38, 39].
In the latter realm of classifying terms and security con-
trols, Lee, et al. [38, 40] examined the DITSCAP [21], the 
predecessor to the DIACAP [1], and its family of documents. 
Their goal was to facilitate security certification by linking 
together federal regulatory requirements across document 
abstraction levels. They defined three requirement levels 
to separate high- and low-level security requirements [38]. 
At the top were generic requirement document categories, 
where the OMB A-130 [23] fit, that described the “Why” of 
the security plan, security development strategy, or techni-
cal control summary. Drilling down yielded domain span-
ning requirements, embedded in policy documents such 
as the DoDI 8500.1 [22], which expanded the higher-level 
categories. Finally, at the bottom were sub-domain require-
ments which further specified “how” the higher require-
ments should be implemented in systems, using controls 
in the DoDI 8500.2 and operational guidelines in the DoD 
5200.2 [20].
Lee et al. [38] provided basic natural language (NL) 
requirement extraction by (1) decomposing complex require-
ments into atomic statements, (2) determining the level of 
abstraction that an atomic statement applies to, (3) assign-
ing it to one of the DITSCAP requirement categories, and 
(4) eliminating any conflicts that may exist between docu-
ments. Several ontological linking relations, such as com-
ply_to, specific_to, and realized_by, were defined to link the 
requirements between levels. The end result was an infor-
mal, natural language, network of requirements that could 
be used to build a DITSCAP checklist for organizations to 
assess compliance against. While helpful and novel when 
originally developed, their approach is limited by its infor-
mal nature and by its attachment to DITSCAP-related docu-
ments, which are now obsolete.
Tsoumas et al. [39] develop a risk analysis approach 
that relates various elements involved in the risk assess-
ment, mitigation, and certification lifecycle. Their frame-
work allows high-level policy statements (the “what”) to be 
linked to lower-level security controls (the “how”), similarly 
to Lee’s approach. In their work, a system profile is con-
structed to identify system assets and represent the security 
controls used to protect them. This construction relies on 
statements in OWL-DL [34], which are quantified over the 
assets in order to define the necessary and sufficient con-
ditions required for policy compliance. OWL, or the Web 
Ontology Language [34], comes with a RDF, i.e., resource 
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description framework, serialization that facilitates com-
mon interchange. Despite OWLs wide acceptance as a W3C 
standard [34], it can be unnecessarily complex and is not the 
right representation tool for every situation.
Taguchi et al. [8] construct a framework, targeted at the 
Common Criteria, for modeling security requirements and 
facilitating security assurance. Their framework consists of 
a meta-model and a multistep requirements and assurance 
lifecycle for specifying and verifying use and misuse cases. 
The meta-model, constructed similarly to ontologies, defines 
the structure of the Common Criteria using a two-actor 
environment (a user and threat agent) and set of use cases 
and security functions that realize CC security functional 
requirements and prevent threats to assets [8]. The phases of 
their lifecycle resemble the NIST lifecycle [2, 13] and assist 
security analysts by mapping security control requirements 
in the Common Criteria to use/misuse cases for certification 
efforts.
Breaux and Anton [19], in widely accepted work focused 
on healthcare regulations [19, 41], develop the notion of 
using semantic patterns for extracting and expressing pri-
vacy policy requirements from HIPAA regulation state-
ments. Although the concept of patterning natural language 
is not new, their approach successfully uses it to develop 
triples of actor, action, and object to state compliance con-
straints as exceptions, obligations, and rights. Despite the 
exceptional nature of their work, their patterned approach is 
specific to HIPAA because the privacy statements follow a 
regular format that is not found in, or applicable to, security 
control regulatory documents [19]. Privacy controls, which 
have been forcibly separated in the NIST SP800-53r4, can be 
generalized into handling, storing, and transmitting. HIPAA 
has a very strong focus on data handling by personnel and is 
only related to health data, which is why Anthem Blue Cross 
was not penalized when hackers were able to access 80 mil-
lion US personal identifying information, including social 
security number, birth dates, and employers, but not health 
care information [42]. The policy statements are at a higher 
level than the NIST and related security controls. Thus, they 
are not constructed with a structure that would be amenable 
to formalization and this is one of the drawbacks of HIPAA. 
Others using semantic patterns include Daramola et al. [43], 
who create what they refer to as requirements boilerplates 
that allow requirement engineers to fill in the blanks with 
parameterized information related to their application(s). 
Example boilerplates include semantic patterns such as “The 
〈system〉 shall be able to 〈action〉 〈entity〉” [43].
Several tools and research efforts have tried to provide 
a more generalized patterning process for examining func-
tional requirements (not necessarily security requirements), 
expressing them in a patterned way, and using the patterned 
content to support the derivation of class elements. For 
instance, the Requirements Analysis Tool (RAT) [44] adds 
structure to NL statements taken from arbitrary software 
requirements documents to develop a set of heuristics, e.g., 
patterns, that enable the construction of a high-level system 
class diagram. Another tool, called Circe [45], constructs 
and uses domain-specific glossaries, which contain a list of 
key terms and synonyms found in NL requirement document 
text, to perform a series of canonization and tokenization 
steps to transform plain NL text into a structured format. 
It uses model-action-substitution rules (MAS-rules) in the 
transformation process, where a single MAS-rule is a triple, 
〈m, a, s〉 that applies to a requirement t. When m matches a 
fragment of t, the action a is applied resulting in the frag-
ment of t being replaced by s. The end goal is a model of 
the extracted requirements which experts can evaluate for 
correctness.
2.3  Formal system modeling
Once requirements have been extracted from regulatory 
documents, system designers must be able to demonstrate 
their systems satisfy the requirements. Research [26, 37, 39, 
46] has shown that ad hoc approaches that do not formally 
represent security features during the system architectural 
design process are much more prone to vulnerabilities and, 
thus, suffer from increased risk of exploitation. The chal-
lenge for system designers is to represent their systems in a 
form amenable to certification against the extracted regula-
tory requirements. Secure cloud system modeling relies on 
demonstrating virtual isolation [47], security property pres-
ervation in web compositions [48, 49], and operational cor-
rectness [7, 47, 50–53]. Virtual isolation ensures that each 
cloud execution environment is accessible only be approved 
parties [47], e.g., one cloud client cannot view or modify 
data or functionality being used by a second cloud client and 
vice versa. Preserving security properties [48, 49] requires 
demonstrating that there are no local (i.e., pairwise between 
services) or global (i.e., end-to-end across service composi-
tions) violations of data integrity, confidentiality, or avail-
ability regulatory requirements. Such violations may arise 
as a result of trust [49, 54] or communication [48, 49, 54] 
issues that may exist between the selected web services. The 
last issue, operational correctness [47], refers to systems or 
compositions of services performing as expected. In other 
words, functionality meets its stated goals without introduc-
ing error scenarios that could be potentially exploitable.
Overcoming these security modeling challenges has 
been the focus of numerous works [46–49, 55, 56]. Among 
those works, Bleikertz et al. [47] follow a graph theoretic 
approach to express virtual isolation and certain operational 
correctness requirements as graph rules, e.g., for isolation 
two nodes outside of the same security domain may not 
communicate. Their graph rules are then mapped onto the 
formal language VALID [47] which uses model checking to 
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compare the run-time states of virtual machines (VMs) in 
the cloud against the defined security graph rules. Singara-
velu et al. [49] examines the access control, encryption, and 
trust implications associated with end-to-end messaging in 
web service compositions. They introduce WS-FESec as a 
WS-Security extension that improves the end-to-end han-
dling of confidentiality and integrity constraints in messages 
[49]. She et al. [48] propose a message exchange protocol 
for information flow control among composed services to 
reduce violations. Their carry-along policy and pass-on cer-
tificate advertise service flow control policies and prevent 
information leakage by providing appropriate credentials, 
but it incurs a large overhead due to the increased interac-
tion among the services required to appropriately process 
the policy directives.
Cloud systems can also be modeled using a coordination 
language approach. Coordination languages have been used 
successfully to formally verify operational correctness [50, 
51] and security properties over static SOA specifications 
[7, 51, 57]. The primary coordination language construct is 
a tuple space. Tuple spaces are a well-studied data structure 
[7, 57–59] that facilitate a data-driven model of component 
interactions. Tuple space usage originated with the parallel 
programming language Linda [59], which provided the three 
operators in, out, and rd to allow tuples to be, respectively, 
entered, removed, or read from the tuple space. Merrick 
et al. [58] established a set of scoping rules that allowed 
Linda tuple spaces to be nested or isolated from one another. 
KLAIM [51] first introduced permissions to tuple spaces 
providing access control mechanisms capable of limiting 
which processes or components in a system can manipu-
late or read the content of tuples in a space. Their approach 
relies on a set of static access control policies to limit certain 
processes to their respective spaces and is course grained 
meaning single tuples and data fields cannot be restricted 
within a tuple space.
Recently, Linda-like tuple spaces have been applied by 
Bravetti et al. [52] to model and secure coordination in un-
trusted interaction environments that occur between com-
posed services. Their work developed a language called 
SecSpaces [52] which refines Linda tuples with asymmetric 
key-based control fields that provide fine-grained access 
control over elements in a tuple. A SecSpace tuple may only 
be read, i.e., rd, if the provided credential matches the stored 
private key. However, despite these advances from previ-
ous Linda iterations, SecSpaces lacks the formal proof logic 
necessary to prove temporal interaction properties. Another 
coordination language, named X-UNITY [7, 53], pro-
nounced “cross-unity,” offers all of the fine-grained access 
control and encryption capabilities of SecSpaces, but also 
brings to bear a powerful temporal proof logic associated 
with its predecessors [50, 60]. Of the coordination languages 
available, it provides the most fertile ground for representing 
services in the cloud and the best proof theory for proving 
temporal properties over service specifications. The compli-
ance models derived by our extraction process can be used 
to direct certifications in any of the above, and many other, 
temporal logic-based modeling paradigms.
2.4  Addressing security requirements 
during development
Extracting and modeling security requirements strictly for 
use during the design phase of the software development 
lifecycle is not sufficient. Instead, those requirements should 
also be applicable throughout the implementation, certifi-
cation, and maintenance phases. Multiple research efforts 
[61–68] have explored how formalized security require-
ments and formal methods used in the design process can 
be translated into developer-friendly tools for use during 
product implementation. Generally, these approaches focus 
on providing traceability from requirements to code to test 
cases [61–63], weakness, threat, and vulnerability reposi-
tories knowledge re-use for risk assessment and mitigation 
[64–66], and tool support for certification [67, 68].
Keeping code traceable to the requirements that gener-
ated it to the test cases that assess whether those require-
ments are satisfied or not is the central focus of many efforts 
within the requirements engineering community. Wang et al. 
[61] examined this problem in the context of open source 
projects using a mapping approach called a requirements 
traceability matrix. Using an open source project called 
iTrust as a case study, they identify three common situa-
tions that lead to traceability concerns—extending an exist-
ing requirement, implementing a requirement, and realizing 
a previously unfulfilled requirement. Ghezzi et al. [62] focus 
on formal methods that account for the iterative effect of 
continuous evolution. They use an incremental model-check-
ing approach based on evolving statecharts to state logical 
properties and compare them against a system model during 
agile development. Mahmoud and Niu [63] focus on refac-
toring techniques that recover structural vocabulary terms 
to improve information retrieval (IR)-based traceability 
techniques that span code, tests, and requirements. Their 
approach works by making textual artifacts more norma-
tive through systematic refactoring using three operations 
(Rename Identifier, Move Method, eXtract Method) adapted 
from other in IR-based approaches. Rename focuses on 
ensuring terminological consistency across software evolu-
tions in a way that maps to the original design requirements. 
Move method removes misplaced signs of traceability by 
ensuring that code is packaged in the place it was designed 
to be in. Finally, extract method removes duplicated code 
where requirements may be traced to multiple instances of 
the same code, based on copy-paste style programming.
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Knowledge re-use efforts largely focus on using formal 
methods and requirements side-by-side with repositories, 
such as CWE [15] and CVE [16], to generate certifica-
tion criteria for use during design and development. One 
approach by Hermoye et al. [64, 65] uses extends formal 
semantics in the KAOS [69] framework to allow for the use 
of attack pattern libraries and associated countermeasures. 
Attack patterns express anti-goals, domain properties, and 
predicates generically. The re-use approach is 4-phased. First 
retrieve relevant generic attack patterns. Next, specialize 
them, by adapting the patterned concepts to fit the specific 
cases applicable for the system of interest. Third contextual-
ize anti-goals according to the how and why the specialized 
attack applies to the system. Finally, derive new or re-use 
existing requirements that act as countermeasures for the 
identified contextualized threats. In similar work by Saeki 
and Kaiya [66], the Common Criteria is used alongside 
the ECMA-271 E-COFC [70] as the source of knowledge 
for requirements elicitation. As with Hermoye, Saeki and 
Kaiya [66] focus on the role of a threat catalog, however, 
the countermeasures that they emphasize (i.e., the security 
requirements that mitigate identified attack patterns) are 
derived directly from security controls specifying Security 
Functional Components in the CC.
Tool support is another area focused on developers. It is 
important for approaches relying on formal methods and 
formally stated requirements to consider how those meth-
ods and requirements can be presented developers in an 
understandable and usable way [67]. Hence, tools are often 
developed to assist developers in applying formal require-
ments analysis techniques during development. Yu et al. 
[68] propose a meta-model and associated automated tool, 
called OpenRISA, that makes the connection from formal 
methods to formal arguments that can be used in support 
of the risk assessment process. Their work extends ear-
lier security argumentation work by Haley et al. by adding 
support for public security catalogs (such as CAPEC [71] 
and CWE [15]) and automatic reasoning. Figure 4, from 
[68], overviews the RISA approach. The process seeks to 
prioritize risks and identify mitigations using a combina-
tion of the security requirements on the system and public 
repositories of attack patterns and software weaknesses. Our 
work in this paper fits within steps 2 and 3 of the RISA 
approach, as we have highlighted in red atop the figure. Our 
work offers increased precision for security requirements as 
well as traceability to the regulatory documents where the 
security functional requirements were generated. The logic-
based syntax of our requirements process is integrable with 
approaches such as the RISA method.
3  Governance patterns and formalization
The first step in extract requirements from regulatory docu-
ments involves identifying common elements expressed 
in the natural language text of the document. This section 
defines a set of security governance patterns capable of 
directing control statement property extractions. Associated 
Fig. 4  RISA method from [68]. Improving steps 2–3 (overlaid in red) through more precise and integrative requirement specification, as in the 
compliance hierarchy modeling process, are within the scope and purvey of our work in this paper (color figure online)
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with each pattern is a modeling template that maps extracted 
control content to a temporal logic construct based on the 
pattern type. The logic constructs are reminiscent of first 
order logic, but also rely on elements of temporal state-
based logic, such as in [60]. The patterns were empirically 
derived by examining existing controls in existing regulatory 
standards in a way that allows them to be applied regardless 
of organizational, business, or government agency bounda-
ries. To ensure future re-use, the derivation process of each 
pattern is clearly defined. This means that compliance predi-
cates formed by applying the patterns can be used for verify-
ing an information system’s behaviors, without being tied 
to specific document syntax. It also means that the pattern-
based extraction and modeling process can accommodate 
newly introduced controls as they come out, such as those 
that may specifically address web services and cloud secu-
rity, in a way that can be transformed to a verification con-
struct consistent with other existing security constraints. It 
goes beyond the NIST SP800-53Ar4, which provides insight 
into using “examination,” “interview,” and/or “testing” to 
establish parts of security controls, by highlighting relation-
ships among controls so that the certification techniques can 
also be directly related depending on the family and indi-
vidual specification of the control.
All security controls have a general security policy intent, 
or area of security within an information system, such as 
separation of duties or cryptographic mechanisms. Deter-
mining the intent is the first step in the patterning process 
and is based on the placement of the control in the gov-
erning document, its descriptive title, and the context of its 
goal statement. Assigning intent to security controls forms 
an intent class that relates controls based on their specific 
requirements. If an examined control does not fit into any 
existing class, then a new class is formed. For example, pat-
terning a control related to determining which events should 
be audited would introduce an “auditable event” intent class. 
Another control, perhaps describing the type of encryption 
mechanism for audit records, does not conceptually fit with 
types of auditable events. Instead a new class with the intent 
of “audit protection” would be created. Controls in classes 
that are closely related can be periodically reexamined as 
the extraction process progresses to determine if any can 
be deemed a better fit in another intent class. The result 
is a partitioning of controls at a fine enough granularity to 
separate concerns, but not so fine that there are unnecessary 
hierarchies.
Each intent class will ultimately form a separate secu-
rity control hierarchy. Each control in a class must first 
be extracted by a governance pattern. The pattern used is 
selected based the control’s information content. Analy-
sis of the governing documents indicates that a security 
control targets one of three information system functional 
goals (1) it requires the information system(s) to abide by 
the formatting and parameters that the organization imposes, 
(2) it supplies information about how a function should per-
form some mission critical security functionality, or (3) it 
defines mechanisms that protect critical assets. Other techni-
cal controls relate to the definition of policy artifacts that the 
organization designates for human review and intervention. 
Though this last type is a pattern, it is non-technical and thus 
outside the scope of this work, which specifically focuses on 
technical requirements.
Each governance pattern, i.e., imposes, performs, or 
protects, requires security analysts to select a certain level 
that denotes the scope of the control. The possible levels 
include Org (organization), meaning the control statement 
is based on an organization-wide directive, InfoSys (informa-
tion system), meaning it applies to an information system 
implementation, or Comp (component) meaning the state-
ment applies to a specific component or process within an 
information system.
Using a box notation similar to that found in Z [72], we 
define a model template to house and formally express the 
information in each patterned control. The template, shown 
in Fig. 5, consists of three fields. The top identifies the con-
trol statement by its document of origin and identifier. The 
middle is used to formally define a set of declared variables, 
extracted by the security control pattern. Unless specifically 
designated, these variables are universally quantified within 
the instantiated template. The bottom is the constraint spec-
ification that defines logical relations embodying compli-
ance requirements in the extracted control. Requirements 
that express a temporal state change are represented using a 
“leads-to” relation. The statement p “leads to” q means that 
when a system reaches a state which satisfies the predicate 
p, eventually it will reach a state satisfying another predicate 
q, whether or not p still holds in q [35]. Bolded text in a 
template denotes a label that may be re-used across controls. 
These labels are helpful when multiple controls specifically 
reference elements defined by other related controls. All 
patterns use the same template, but may have slight varia-
tions in their actual instantiation and expression based on the 
information extracted by the governance pattern.
Applying the patterns to the full set of organizationally 
selected controls results in an enumeration of compliance 
requirements, that when grouped into compliance predicates, 
collectively define the organizations mandated security 
declared_var1 : Type
⁞ 
declared_varN : Type
[document, control idenfier]
Constraint or Rule
Fig. 5  Modeling template
Requirements Engineering 
1 3
profile. The following sections detail each pattern, describ-
ing the types of controls it applies to, what information is to 
be extracted, and how to formalize the extracted information. 
The patterns are highlighted in the context of the running 
audit case study.
3.1  Imposes
Security control documentation requires organizations to 
select certain policy parameters and impose them on desig-
nated critical information assets. To accommodate and rep-
resent this type of security control, we created the imposes 
pattern. The imposes pattern specifically applies at the Org 
level meaning that the organization applies policy param-
eters to certain identified assets in all of the information sys-
tems it controls and uses. It is important to note that imposes 
cannot apply to Info Sys or Comp levels. The imposes pattern 
is read as follows:
where 〈policy entities〉 are the organizationally defined 
parameters that constrain information assets denoted by 
〈assets〉 or, more generally, all information systems (when 
〈assets〉 is left null). Policy entities govern particular fac-
ets of the system such as specifying the encryption method 
systems must use, establishing information record keeping 
requirements for audit record assets, or defining auditable 
events. For imposes patterned controls, the definition and 
representation of policy entities constitute the compliance 
requirements associated with the control statement.
Formulating an imposes requirement involves identifying 
the policy entities and the assets they are imposed on and 
then mapping the extracted fields to the modeling template 
from Fig. 5. This mapping includes typing, quantifying, 
and perhaps constraining each extracted control parameter. 
When typing control parameters, we assume a basic set 
of primitive types exist, such as String, Integer, Boolean, 
Org imposes ⟨policy entities⟩ on ⟨assets⟩
and Component. Other complex types may be defined dur-
ing control extraction to represent the specific semantics of 
control parameters. Complex types are generally objects 
that are developed from primitive types. An example might 
be a type called UID, which is a semantically meaningful 
type of Integer that defines a user ID. The typing process 
also allows for the definition of sets, simply denoted as Set 
〈type〉, and powersets denoted as℘ 〈type〉, where type is a 
defined primitive or complex type. Here, a set is an unor-
dered collection of the underlying type and a powerset is 
a set of sets of the underlying type. Finally, the notation ↑ 
〈typename〉 is used to designate a Compliance Type which 
is a compliance predicate that results from the development 
of a semantic hierarchy elsewhere in the compliance model; 
this is discussed extensively in Sect. 4.5.
As an example, Fig. 6 illustrates an audit security con-
trol from the Common Criteria called FAU_GEN.1.2. This 
control, from the functional audit family, imposes six con-
tent parameters on all information system audit records and 
allows for additional content to be included in the record. 
During control extraction, an intent class called Audit 
Records is created to collect groups of controls, includ-
ing FAU_GEN.1.2, that are related to how an audit record 
is defined. The instantiation of the imposes pattern for 
FAU_GEN.1.2 appears under its NL control statement in 
Fig. 6. The filled modeling template to the right identifies 
the Common Criteria as the document and FAU_GEN.1.2 
as the control id. Below the title box are the declared vari-
ables which represent the policy entity parameters extracted 
by imposes. Given these parameters, the information asset, 
called record, is defined to be “at least” the required param-
eters, as denoted by the symbol (≍), but could potentially 
have additional content parameters. The record will con-
tribute to the AuditRecord type as shown later in Fig. 16. A 
discussion describing how FAU_GEN.1.2 fits into the Audit 
Record compliance hierarchy is provided in Sect. 4.
Fig. 6  Imposes pattern applied 
to the Common Criteria control 
FAU_GEN.1.2
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3.2  Performs
The second pattern, called performs, expresses constraints 
that relate directly to properties of system functionality. The 
pattern relies on an action to specify the functional behavior, 
a set of pre-conditions and input that constrain the applica-
tion of the action, and a set of post-conditions that detail the 
results of the action’s effects on the system. Often a post-
condition for a security functional requirement dictates that 
an asset or artifact is created or modified. For this reason, 
the pattern explicitly separates generic post-conditions from 
assets or artifacts which must be produced as a result of the 
execution of an action. For policy statements that do not 
specify asset or artifact creation, this field should be left null. 
Performs is thus defined as follows:
where 〈level〉 is either InfoSys or Comp (cannot be Org). 
Often the line demarcating the InfoSys and Comp is blurred, 
since the information system may designate a certain com-
ponent to perform the action. In such cases, InfoSys is cho-
sen as the level for consistency and the use of a component 
becomes part of the constraint in the model template.
Declared variables in a performs pattern can be input and 
output variables, and relations between variables, such as 
functional mappings. One distinction is the use of the tem-
poral property leads-to (⧐), borrowing from UNITY seman-
tics [60], in the constraint specification to denote a progress 
property in which eventually a state will be reached from the 
pre-conditions (which may be simply true) where the post-
conditions are true. Sometimes, the pre-conditions and post-
conditions involved in performs are not explicitly stated in 
the security control. In such cases, the pattern instantiation 
relies on the semantics of the action to imply the conditions 
as in the case of FAU_GEN.1.1(c) shown in Fig. 7, where 
the phrase “generate an audit record” implies that the record 
⟨level⟩ performs ⟨action⟩
given ⟨preconditions⟩ and ⟨input⟩
that results in ⟨postconditions⟩
does not already exist. Additionally, the input expressed may 
reference an abstract information system architecture.
Figure 7 shows the extracted performs pattern state-
ment below the stated natural language (NL) control FAU_
GEN.1.1(c) from the Common Criteria. A component-based 
implementation of the information system is inferred given 
the foundation for the Common Criteria specifications. An 
inference is also made that the Target of Evaluation Secu-
rity Functionality (TSF) does not generate audit records 
for all components. Therefore, “a component” is added to 
the given section of the pattern. This inference is based on 
other similar controls from other documents. For compliance 
verification, an organization could select all components to 
be audited, in which case the performs constraint would be 
used to reason over each one separately. The Compliance 
Types ↑AuditableEvent and ↑AuditRecord are used within 
the control, though they are defined as part of other intent 
classes as shown later in Fig. 16. In the model template 
(right side of Fig. 7), the input parameters and a function, 
called Gen_Rec, describing audit record generation actions, 
become declared variables. A leads-to property (bottom of 
template on the right side of Fig. 7) expresses that for any 
component, a state in which an auditable event occurs in 
a selected component and a corresponding record has not 
been generated for the event, eventually leads to a state in 
which the generated audit record for the event is placed in 
the component’s audit log. Note that Gen_Rec does not have 
to be part of component c. Neither does the evaluation of 
an occurrence of the event. Also, the notation (‘) is used 
to denote the “after state” of a variable as in c.auditLog 
and c.auditLog’. Stated specifically, a variable x’ denotes 
the “after state” of a variable x. Since the performs pat-
tern denotes a requirement for a state change, its assessment 
could be in the form of evaluating traces, such as the use of 
security hyperproperties [73].
3.3  Protects
A third pattern is used when a security control identifies 
assets, processes, or functions that must be protected against 
Fig. 7  The performs pattern as 
applied to the Common Criteria 
control FAU_GEN.1.1(c)
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some negative activity, such as malicious user actions. This 
security control type prescribes a selection of high- or low-
level protection mechanisms. For technical controls, these 
protection mechanisms can include performs constraints, 
thus incorporating that pattern. Given these considerations, 
the protects pattern captures the relevant information as 
follows:
where 〈level〉 can be InfoSys or Comp. InfoSys more gener-
ally represents the need to protect the asset using some per-
forms function specified in the system, while Comp indicates 
an actual component which deploys the mechanism respon-
sible for protecting the asset. The protection 〈mechanism〉 
is imposed by the organization and may be either a type of 
encryption method, digital signature, or monitoring process 
depending on whether the 〈activity〉 violates a confidential-
ity, integrity, or availability security objective, respectively.
The protects pattern may need additional context to 
extract the 〈mechanism〉 from the control text. The mecha-
nisms may appear elsewhere in the control document such 
as the NIST supplemental guidance section of a security 
control [2] or may be embedded in a separate security con-
trol that has a semantic link to the control being expressed 
(discussed further in Sect. 4). Protects involves declaring 
and quantifying the assets for protection, the activity to be 
prevented, and the function or set of functions to be used. 
Each function is expressed as part of a performs statement, 
which must be included or semantically linked to the control 
that instantiates the protects pattern. Function labels, shown 
in bold, label performs constraints. These labels are refer-
enced within the protects instantiation of the control state-
ment to indicate the logical dependencies needed to describe 
the mechanism function expectations.
⟨level⟩ protects ⟨asset⟩
using ⟨mechanism⟩
to prevent ⟨activity⟩
Figure 8 shows the performs constraints for AU-10.E3 
that defines review(r), for an audit record r. The review(r) 
function is one of four mechanisms used in AU-10.G to pre-
vent repudiation of audit records. The control text establishes 
the need for a reviewer’s UID to be stored in the audit record 
upon review and requires the UID to be signed. The performs 
pattern is applied to the control text on the top left of Fig. 8 
and results in the pattern instantiation below it. Contextu-
ally, the “information” described by the control text refers 
to all audit records created as the result of a user’s actions 
that have been previously validated to insure the user UID 
has not been modified. A binding mechanism (BindRev), 
such as a digital signature mechanism, is assumed as input. 
This definition of review(r) states that whenever an audit 
record, r, has been validated (i.e., using validatedUID(r)) 
and a review request is initiated (occurs(e)), a state eventu-
ally results that adds the reviewer’s UID to the audit record 
(r’ = bindRev(r, rev_uid)) and signs it (r’.revUID.signed). 
The concept of signing, although not directly in the control 
statement, is inferred from the control’s references to “cre-
dentials” and “associates the identity.”
AU-10.G incorporates AU-10.E3, and three other con-
trols, as part of a compliance requirement to ensure non-
repudiation of audit records. Figure 9 shows the result of 
extracting the requirements of AU-10.G and instantiating a 
protects pattern. The context of the control implies that the 
set of all audit records is the 〈asset〉 in the pattern. The con-
trol does not directly specify the mechanism to protect the 
audit records because it relies on the control enhancements 
which are referred to by their labels (including review(r) as 
developed in Fig. 8.
The 〈activity〉 the control seeks protection from is 
repudiation. Thus, repudiation is of type Activity. The 
function prevents is standardized within the protects pat-
tern to collect and apply the mechanisms on the assets. 
In this case, prevents(repudiation, r), in Fig. 9, means 
the activity of repudiation as applied to the set of audit 
records r is prevented from occurring as long as at least 
Fig. 8  The performs pattern 
within AU-10.E3
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one of the mechanisms (e.g., signUID, validateUID, 
review, and transfer) is performed.
In the case of AU.10.G, protects expresses the overall 
mechanisms to prevent a bad state from occurring while 
at the same time dictating the state changes allowed by 
the mechanisms. The signUID, validateUID, review, 
and transfer mechanisms are individually instantiated 
as performs compliance requirements and hierarchically 
connected to AU-10.G via a semantic relation (discussed 
later in Sect. 4.2). As long as the performs compliance 
requirements are satisfied, prevents(a) holds and repu-
diation cannot occur in the information system. This 
knowledge, required for formalizing a protects property, 
is derived from the semantic relations connected to AU-
10.G. Understanding these relations is the topic of the 
next section.
4  Creating semantic hierarchies using 
semantic relations
Determining the compliance predicates that provide cov-
erage of the security controls requires identifying the 
relationships that exist between security controls, start-
ing with those in the same intent classes. As these con-
nections are investigated, within each class, a semantic 
hierarchy emerges that identifies a dominant control, i.e., 
a control whose expression encompasses the requirements 
of the class. This section defines four semantic relations 
based on their structural properties and the subsequent 
representations that describe how compliance require-
ments are affected by, and propagate over, the relation. 
The relations are irreflexive, anti-symmetric, and transi-
tive such that for any relation type (except forms), if a 
control C1 is related to another control C2 by a relation 
R1 and C2 is related to a third control C3 by relation 
R2, then C1 is related to C3 by R1. If there is a relation 
R3, such that controls are related by R1, then R3, then 
R2, transitivity is not proven to hold in all cases. The 
audit case study is continued for clarity and illustrative 
purposes.
4.1  SubsumedBy
A control, c1, is subsumedBy another control, c2, as repre-
sented by c1 →  c2 iff:
• both controls are instantiated by the same pattern and
• the specification constraint of c2 implies the specification 
constraint of c1.
Figure 10 exemplifies three controls, ECTP-1, FAU_
STG.1.1, and APP3690.4 with intent Audit Protection that 
are subsumedBy AU-9.G, with the same intent. AU-9.G 
specifies the need to protect all audit records, the audit trail, 
and all audit reports from unauthorized access, modification, 
or deletion, thus subsuming the types declared for assets as 
well as the activities being prevented on those assets. No 
specific process is required by the control constraints, so 
organizations may construct any protective mechanisms to 
ensure that prevents is satisfied.
4.2  UsedBy
Figure 9 illustrated the instantiation of a protects pattern 
with labeled mechanisms, one of which, i.e., review(r), was 
described in Fig. 8. The usedBy semantic relation, repre-
sented by c1  c2 in Fig. 11, indicates the inclusion 
of a predicate s in c1 (in this case a labeled performs state-
ment) in a predicate t in c2, such as the prevents repudiation 
activity. Parameters for s and t can be used within the label 
to clarify which predicates in c1 are usedBy predicates in c2, 
if it is not obvious.
Examining Fig. 11 in more detail shows that FAU_
GEN.2.1 specifies and labels the performs statement, 
signUID(r), which takes an audit record r and eventually 
returns it as a signed record r’, using the organization-
ally defined digital signature mechanism represented by 
signMech. Though no formal relationship exists in the 
documents, FAU_GEN.2.1 (Common Criteria) can be 
linked to the NIST AU-10.G and AU-10.E2 using usedBy 
to provide a functional requirement detail regarding sign-
ing that is missing in the NIST. AU-10.E2 defines a vali-
dation mechanism, validateUID(r) that examines an audit 
Fig. 9  Protects pattern applied 
to NIST control AU-10.G
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record for a proper digital signature whenever a review 
request is made on the record. If the record is signed (i.e., 
signUID(r) is true), then eventually a state is reached 
when the record is verified, using the organizationally 
defined verify method that supplements signMech, allow-
ing it to be reviewed.
AU-10.E3 (shown originally in Fig. 8) expresses the 
binding of a reviewer’s user ID to the record ensuring 
the reviewer cannot repudiate the review. AU-10.E4 
in Fig. 11 states that the audit record reviews are vali-
dated prior to transferring the record outside the secu-
rity enclave. Thus, transfer(r) is true if an audit record 
transfer request occurs that eventually results in a state in 
which verifyRevUID is performed on r to ensure that the 
signed reviewer uid is legitimate. Each of the predicates 
signUID, validatedUID, review, and transfer prevents 
repudiation and therefore are usedBy (and included in) 
the prevents(repudiation) predicate detailed in the con-
straint portion of AU-10.G. Because the predicates are 
also included in the other non-repudiation mechanisms, 
usedBy denotes that relationship as well.
4.3  Structures
Information systems generally require a number of secu-
rity-sensitive assets and types. Individual security controls 
related to assets and types may impose a representational 
format as well as define asset and type attributes. An exam-
ple in Fig. 12 is the STIG APP3620 control that requires 
a secrecy level attribute that is one of {top secret, secret, 
unclassified} to be associated with all auditable events. 
Thus, the control defines a specific structural element of the 
auditable event definition.
In fact, a type’s structure, or format, may be partially 
defined in multiple security controls to provide a fuller 
representation of the type. The structures semantic relation 
appends type definitions to assets defined in other controls 
by denoting specific formatting elements. Thus, c1 struc-
tures c2, represented by c1  c2, states that a declared 
variable in c1 defines some portion of the structure of a 
declared variable in c2. Parameters of structures identify 
the appropriate variables in c1 and c2. If only one variable 
is declared in the schema for the control, then that variable 
Fig. 10  Portion of the audit 
protection control hierarchy that 
is subsumedBy AU-9.G
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is a parameter by default and is not made explicit within the 
semantic relation.
Figure 12 illustrates two scenarios using structures—
when it is applied to an asset type and when it is inserted as 
an element of a tuple to format a type. Control FAU_SEL.1.1 
specifies the various elements of an auditable event. As used 
in Fig. 6, the ≍ symbol denotes that an event is at least com-
posed of the elements specified in the associated tuple. This 
constraint is transitively passed on to AE, in AU-2.G, which 
defines all possible auditable events. Effectively, the relation 
between FAU_SEL.1.1 and AU-2.G, i.e., structures(event, 
AE), expresses that all auditable events at least contain the 
information in the event tuple. This example corresponds 
to the first case described by the structures relation defini-
tion. Structures is also used as a relation between APP3620/
FAU_GEN.1.1 and FAU_SEL.1.1, in which secrecyLevel 
and detailLevel format the event tuple.
In terms of certification, verifying AU-2.G is correctly 
implemented requires that, for all events e in AE, e contains 
at least the information dictated by event. Thus, satisfying 
AU-2.G with the additional constraints means the controls 
related by structures are also satisfied.
4.4  Refines
Where structures targets compliance types, refines covers 
compliance relations. The primary motivation for refines is 
to make a generic constraint, e.g., the system must audit 
important events, more specific, e.g., the system must audit 
user login. Control c1 refines control c2, (c1  c2), 
denotes a refinement of a declared variable v2 in c2, by a 
declared variable v1 in c1. The refinement relation requires 
v1 and v2 to be the same type. In addition, it may affect the 
structure of the resulting constraint specification for c2.
Fig. 11  The non-repudiation control hierarchy with the usedBy relation
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On the top left of Fig. 13 is AU-5.G.b, which is the 
dominant control in the control hierarchy of an intent class 
for detailing the contents of the Audit Failure Mapping. It 
comprises the organizational failure mapping (orgAFM), 
which embodies the actions (AFActions) that must occur in 
the case of certain audit failure events (AFEvents) as dictated 
Fig. 12  Building up the struc-
ture of AuditableEvents using 
structures
Fig. 13  Using refines for the 
organizational audit failure 
mapping control hierarchy
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by the refines operator. Connected to AU-5.G.b are a num-
ber of controls that dictate particular (AFEvent, AFAction) 
pairs. Each of these pairs refines the orgAFM, establishing 
particular events and actions or sets of events and actions, 
such as real-time alerts (AU-5.E2), events that require sys-
tem shutdown (AU-5.E4), traffic threshold exceeded (AU-5.
E3), or storage threshold exceeded (FAU_STG.3.1 and 
FAU_STG.4), as part of the failure mapping.
Bold elements in the constraint specification portion 
denote how the refinement occurs. Bold elements in the 
declared variables section denote which variables influence 
the refinement. The label on the arrow indicates the direction 
of the refinement and what is being refined. Controls lower 
in the hierarchy refine orgAFM by adding elements. For 
instance, FAU_STG.3.1 and FAU_STG.4 require that certain 
failure actions (a warning, ignore event, prevent event, or 
overwrite previous events) must be available if audit record 
storage is exceeded. Figure 11 also shows the transitive use 
of refinement where FAU_STG.4 refines the event-action 
pairs in the audit failure mapping (AFM) called storageAFM 
described in FAU_STG.3.1 to include the actions of warn-
ing, ignore, prevent, and overwrite.
4.5  Forms
One of the primary research goals of this work was to pro-
duce a representative expression of each intent class in the 
form of a compliance type or a compliance rule. As the 
investigation progressed and the intent classes were defined, 
we found that at least one of the documents had a control 
that dominated the others in its class. Often it was an abstract 
or high-level control statement that allowed it to encompass 
the details of the other controls. The forms relation termi-
nates the developed control hierarchy by linking this domi-
nant control to the resulting compliance type or compliance 
rule. If a dominant control does not emerge, then the intent 
class should be decomposed into multiple intents of a finer 
granularity of expression so that a single type or rule reflects 
the intent. Since forms is only defined between a dominant 
control and a compliance predicate, it is not transitive.
The forms relation reflects the instantiated pattern of the 
dominant control. When the dominant control is an imposes 
pattern, it forms a compliance type. A compliance type 
defines the format, fields, and constraints on the instances 
of an information asset. Dominant controls that instantiate 
either performs or protects patterns form compliance rules 
that dictate security relations for types and functions. Forms 
is represented visually as c  CI, where c is the domi-
nant control and CI is the compliance item (either a rule or 
type), and the result of its application is that all controls in 
the control hierarchy below c hold whenever CI holds. If this 
perspective (i.e., complete compliance) is not desired by the 
information system designers, then one or more branches 
can be pruned from hierarchies that define CI specific to 
accommodate their selected partial compliance verification 
process.
Figure 14 exemplifies the two types of forms relations. 
On the left, the dominant control AU-5.G.a directly forms 
the Audit Failure Response compliance rule. AU-5.G.a is 
a dominant control based on a performs pattern because it 
fully encompasses the controls for that intent class as shown 
by the semantic relations of the hierarchy.
Fig. 14  Forming compliance 
predicates
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On the right of Fig. 14 is the compliance type for Failure 
Mapping. All controls that form the failure mapping (includ-
ing AU-5.G.b) are based on imposes patterns. It is interesting 
that AU-5 provides information for both a compliance type 
and a compliance rule thus spanning two intent classes when 
its details are extracted. AU-5.G.b is the dominant control 
of its intent class because its statement regarding the failure 
mapping type allows it to be structured and constrained by 
controls also instantiating the imposes pattern lower in the 
control hierarchy. The resulting type is then the AFMapping, 
as seen in the yellow box on the right in Fig. 14.
Table 1 provides summary guidelines for applying each 
type of semantic relation based on subject matter expert 
feedback (collected as part of the formative evaluation dis-
cussed later in Sect. 6.2).
5  Compliance interconnectivity spanning 
hierarchies in the audit case study
The hierarchy formed through the process of intent determi-
nation, NL patterning, and semantic relationship definition 
produces high-level elements, segregated into compliance 
rules and compliance types that provide a security verifica-
tion profile with respect to the controls in the governing 
documents. Though our case study focuses specifically on 
audit, the process also produces related hierarchies across 
the other technical control categories including access con-
trol (AC), identification and authentication (IA), and system 
and communications protection (SC) in [2] and communica-
tion (class FCO), cryptographic support (class FCS), user 
data protection (class FDP), identification and authentica-
tion (class FIA), protection of the TSF (class FPT), resource 
utilization (class FRU), TOE access (class FTA), and trusted 
path/channels (class FTP) in [3].
Within and across technical control categories, there are 
relationships that should be exploited so that compliance can 
be easily documented by progressing through the compli-
ance rules and types and then identifying any branches of 
hierarchies that may be non-compliant. This section intro-
duces top-level semantic relations that can be used to con-
nect compliance predicates (Compliance Rules and Types) 
together to denote control document interconnections. This 
makes the security profile specification more understand-
able by information system designers and certifiers and 
facilitates re-use by other organizations who need only apply 
their specific parameters to instantiate the profile. The top-
level relations are applied to the running audit case study to 
arrive at an overall profile of audit security requirements. 
Each specific predicate in the overall profile is individually 
decomposed and discussed.
5.1  Top‑level semantic relations
When extracting and formalizing the semantic hierarchies 
it became clear that intent classes were related at a high 
level. Each intent class has its own semantic hierarchy of 
controls that define specific compliance requirements for a 
system, but may also have additional interdependencies. For 
instance, defining auditable events in isolation is meaning-
less if the system does not have an audit record generation 
capability. Similarly, audit records cannot be protected if 
they do not exist. Following this rationale, it is clear that 
additional, high-level semantic relations are needed to 
express hierarchy-spanning compliance interconnectivity.
To denote these cross-hierarchy relationships our 
approach includes a set of top-level semantic relations 
that are defined between different compliance predicates, 
denoted as p1 and p2. Their definitions appear below and in 
the overall audit profile as shown in Fig. 15, discussed next.
• p1 includedIn p2 indicates that the constraints in the 
Compliance Rule p1 are needed for p2’s verification.
• p1 targets p2 indicates that p1 has embedded constraints 
that influence or affect variables or constraints in p2.
• p1 creates p2 indicates that when the predicate in Com-
pliance Rule p1 evaluates to true, entities described in p2 
are created as a result.
• p1 requiredBy p2 means that the Compliance Type 
defined in p1 is required to define declared variables or 
elements of the constraint in the Compliance Rule p2.
Figure 15 exemplifies the relations and identifies the full 
set of compliance predicates for the entire audit technical 
control family across the governing documents discussed 
in Sect. 2.1, displaying only the control and compliance 
Table 1  Semantic relations
Relation Guidelines for Application
subsumedBy Indicates that one control’s compliance requirements are subsumed by another’s requirements
usedBy Indicates that one control compliance requirements are needed by another’s
structures Indicates that a control defines something (such as a format) regarding another control
refines Indicates that a control clarifies or makes a requirement more explicit in another control
forms Indicates the formation of compliance type or compliance rule from a dominant control
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predicate identifiers. Overall, there are 12 compliance predi-
cates that describe all audit requirements and constitute the 
audit compliance model. Previous Figs. 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 
11, 12, and 13 show certain expanded sections of the com-
pliance model and are highlighted using dotted red boxes.
Based on the constructed method of discovering, rep-
resenting, and relating the predicates, Fig. 15 manifests a 
flow that is directly relevant to the compliance verification 
process. Essentially, the assessment begins by identify-
ing AuditableEvents. Selected auditable events must cause 
audit records to be generated, via Audit Record Generation. 
These generated records take on the particular character-
istics, denoted by creates, of the organizationally defined 
AuditRecord. A subset of these audit records, denoted by 
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Fig. 15  Compliance predicates and their relationships for the audit 
technical control category and beyond. This view presents the entire 
compliance hierarchy relating compliance predicates (in yellow) with 
their associated controls (in gray). Previous figures discussed in detail 
are highlighted (red dotted line) to show their connectivity in the 
overall hierarchy. Theory level relations identify connections between 
disparate compliance predicates (color figure online)
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includedIn, must be compiled into an audit trail to satisfy 
Audit Trail Compilation. Additionally, all audit records must 
be safeguarded (shown by targets) by Audit Protection and 
its three sub-parts (shown by includedIn) Non-Repudiation, 
Audit Access Control, and Audit Cryptography. Records 
should be reviewed using Audit Review and backed-up 
according to Audit Record Backup. Finally, if the audit 
record generation process fails, the Audit Failure Response 
relies on a Failure Mapping to handle audit failures in organ-
izationally specified ways that limit asset exposure.
Figure 16 expands each compliance predicate in Fig. 15, 
showing all of the compliance requirements in the Audit 
Compliance Model. By construction, satisfaction of these 
criteria is sufficient to verify a system or collection of 
systems as compliant with audit security controls across 
all of the governing documents. It is important to note 
that organizations need not comply with all of the audit 
security controls, but in order to satisfy certain controls 
they must satisfy those that are indicated by the top-level 
and inter-hierarchy semantic relations. For instance, an 
organization seeking to be certified with a control that has 
an incoming requiredBy link, must necessarily be certified 
against the linked required control.
Fig. 16  Compliance types, rules, and relations, for the audit technical control category
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5.2  Auditable events
The AuditableEvents compliance type in Fig. 16 relies 
on a cross-product of the relevant event fields described 
within its control hierarchy. Its dominant control, AU-
2.G.a from Fig. 12, restricts the type to organizationally 
selected auditable events as instantiated within the hier-
archy. All auditable events must contain at least the infor-
mation expressed in the tuple according to the governing 
documents. This compliance type is used as input (denoted 
by requiredBy) to Audit Record Generation, discussed in 
Sect. 5.4.
5.3  AuditRecord
As with AuditableEvents, the set of AuditRecords, shown in 
Fig. 16, is constrained to have all of the same characteristics 
as the organizationally defined records type expressed in 
the dominant control that forms the compliance type. For all 
audit records, each record must consist of at least an event 
type, timestamp, location, source, component, outcome, and 
event user ID, but can also have additional content as speci-
fied by the organization.
5.4  Audit Record Generation
The compliance rule for Audit Record Generation, shown in 
Fig. 16, is formed directly from the dominant control FAU_
GEN.1.1(c), as shown in Fig. 7. Essentially, for all compo-
nents, c, if a selected auditable event occurs, then a record 
is generated for that event and placed in the component’s 
audit log, i.e., c.auditLog. The relation creates denotes that 
the result of Audit Record Generation is an entity of compli-
ance type Audit Record. We assume that components must 
have an abstraction of the storage that houses their audit 
records. Otherwise, the component cannot be certified for 
any audit control.
5.5  Audit trail compilation
Audit Trail Compilation, connected to AuditRecord in 
Fig. 16, expresses the constraint that audit records must be 
compiled into a standardized audit trail. The compliance 
rule makes explicit that any audit records collected by a 
component appear in an audit trail. The temporal property 
guarantees that all audit trails will eventually be complete 
with respect to the collected audit records. The compliance 
rule allows for the possibility of multiple audit trails, but 
one must be the “system-wide” or centralized audit trail, as 
required by NIST [2]. Additionally, the requiredBy relation 
ensures that records in the trail conform to the type defined 
in Audit Records.
5.6  Non‑repudiation, audit access control, audit 
cryptography, and audit protection
A set of controls exist to safeguard audit records from 
unintentional or malicious activities. For example, 
the Audit Access Control compliance rule specifies the 
non-discretionary access control policy to be applied to 
all audit assets. The unauthorizedAccess activity is an 
attempted unauthorized access, modification, or deletion. 
NDAC(assets), as shown in the middle left of Fig. 16, 
denotes a labeled performs for applying a non-discretion-
ary access control process to the assets to protect them 
against these activities. This item is left unexpanded, since 
it relies on the Access Control (AC) family of controls 
and is thus outside the scope of the audit case study. If 
expanded, it would have a semantic hierarchy that bridges 
two dominant controls AU-9.E4 (in the audit family) and 
AC-3.E3 (in the access control family). Access control 
can proactively prevent all of the activities on assets given 
proper system usage. However, additional provisions must 
be in place to prevent malicious activities that circumnavi-
gate access control.
The compliance rule, Non-Repudiation (top of Fig. 16), 
prevents user attempts to deny having performed an activ-
ity, i.e., repudiation as described previously in Figs. 9 and 
11.
A third compliance rule Audit Cryptography (lower right 
of Fig. 16) defines the cryptographic mechanisms that can 
be used for securing information assets. All of the various 
labeled performs predicates in the prevents expression repre-
sent various cryptographic mechanisms that may be applied. 
These could be expanded into the full formal predicates they 
represent to facilitate at-a-glance compliance, but again are 
left unexpanded as they cross into other families outside of 
audit (such as SC in the SP800-53 and FCS in the CC-Part2). 
Each mechanism applies to a specific cryptographic area, 
e.g., AES for encryption, RSA for digital signatures, and 
SHA-1 for hashes.
Figure 10 expresses the dominant control AU-9.G and 
some of the controls it subsumes. This dominant control 
and three related compliance rules form the Audit Protec-
tion compliance rule. Audit Protection assures three pre-
vented activities: unauthorized access, modification, assets, 
or repudiation of assets. A single dominant control does 
not actually specify the prevention mechanisms. Instead, 
the three compliance rules, i.e., Audit Access Control, Non-
Repudiation, and Audit Cryptography, are needed to fully 
specify the mechanisms as indicated by the includedIn rela-
tion in Fig. 16.
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5.7  Audit review
The Audit Review (top of Fig. 16) compliance rule dictates 
the process by which audit records are reviewed. Essentially, 
a non-null set of records chosen for review are examined by 
an organizationally specified reviewer and included in an 
organizational asset of type AuditReport. An AuditReport is 
a set of reviewed records with a common purpose. In addi-
tion to being included in the report, the audit records are also 
marked as being reviewed, which is important as we have 
shown with AU-10.G for non-repudiation. This relationship 
is denoted by the application of includedIn between Audit 
Review and Non-Repudiation.
5.8  Audit record backup
Systems that require periodic, no less than weekly, backup 
must comply with the Audit Record Backup compliance rule. 
It provides a way to copy audit records from one compo-
nent to another. Though these can be any two components, 
NIST requires them to be on different systems or media. 
The compliance rule in Fig. 16 for backup denotes a source 
component, a destination component (i.e., dest), an event 
e defined as weeklybackup(AR) where e might be run by 
something like a cron job in an actual implemented system. 
The temporal predicate says that if there are a set of records 
AR in the source component and e occurs, then the records 
are copied using a copy function into the destination com-
ponent, i.e., dest.records.
5.9  Audit failure response and failure mapping
Audit Failure Response and its associated Failure Mapping, 
shown in Fig. 16, provide the last assurance requirement 
with respect to auditing in the governing documents. Audit 
Failure Response applies to a generic audit failure event, 
e, and its associated audit failure action, action. The rule 
says that given that if a failure event e occurs in some com-
ponent, then the corresponding pre-defined action must be 
performed and e must be logged by the audit failure com-
ponent c.
The Failure Mapping is the compliance type that embod-
ies the organizationally and control defined (event, action) 
pairs specifically related to audit failure. It contains all of 
the constraints applied to orgAFM using the refines semantic 
relation, (as previously shown in Fig. 13). Similar to AE 
within the Auditable Event compliance type, AFMapping 
can be expanded to show these constraints. Some of the vari-
ous (event, action) pairs include (storage exceeded, warn-
ing), (traffic exceeded, reject additional traffic), and (audit 
system shutdown, real-time alert) and are consistent with the 
refinements to orgAFM shown in Fig. 13.
6  Evaluation of extraction, formalization, 
and hierarchy creation process
A pilot study was conducted as a means of formative assess-
ment to get feedback regarding the applicability and consist-
ency of the compliance hierarchy formation process. After 
improving the extraction and modeling process, a second 
study summarily assessed the accuracy, efficacy, and pref-
erence of our approach. Both studies were conducted on 
participant pools of subject matter experts (SMEs) who had 
obtained, or were obtaining, CNSSI certificates. The meth-
odology and results of each study are discussed separately 
below.
6.1  Pilot study methodology: formative evaluation 
and feedback
The first study posed three research questions for formative 
feedback and evaluation using SME groups:
RQ1 Is the governance patterning process understand-
able, consistent, and repeatable across different control 
families and groups of SMEs performing requirements 
extraction?
RQ2 Do SMEs consistently identify semantic relation-
ships that exist between controls?
RQ3 How often are extraneous relationships identified 
during the semantic relationship identification process?
To answer these questions, we recruited nine SMEs from 
academia and industry and divided them into three panels 
of three. Each panel was given two collections of security 
controls from the governing documents (i.e., NIST sp800-
53, Common Criteria, and DoDI 8500.2). The first collec-
tion consisted of 7 controls related to identification and 
authentication. The second collection varied between pan-
els. Panel 1 was given controls related to access control and 
authentication. Panel 2 was given controls related to user 
accounts. Panel 3 was given controls related to transmis-
sion protection. The specific controls and their documents 
of origin are given in Table 2. Overall 43 unique controls 
across the governance documents were given to the SME 
panels. Each panel was given four tasks to complete for each 
of their control collections: (1) determine each control’s pat-
tern, (2) identify the semantic relationships among the pro-
vided controls, (3) select one or more dominant controls for 
the collection, and (4) form a compliance hierarchy for the 
control collection.
Prior to SME data collection, we completed the four tasks 
for each of the collections—identifying a control pattern 
for each included control, semantic relationships between 
controls, and identifying a dominant control and hierarchy 
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for the collection. Using our task results as an experimental 
control for comparison against the SME panel results, we 
developed four evaluation criteria E1–E4 as stated below. 
Henceforth, note the difference between use of the term 
control and experimental control; the former is a security 
control while the latter is a control case in the sense of 
experimental testing discussed in this section. Criteria E1 
and E4 both address RQ1, while E2 addresses RQ2 and E3 
addresses RQ3.
E1 Number of control patterns selected by the panels that 
match the control patterns in the experimental control, 
where “match” is defined as the selection of the same 
pattern level, type, and input.
E2 Number of semantic relationships selected by the pan-
els that match the semantic relationships in the experi-
mental control, where “match” is defined as the selection 
of the same relation type, two controls, and directionality.
E3 What extraneous relationships exist (if any) and what 
relationships are missing (if any) from each panel’s hier-
archy as compared to the experimental control’s hierar-
chy?
E4 Inter-rater reliability and internal consistency of pat-
tern identification and hierarchy structure across panels 
for the shared control collection.
6.2  Pilot study results: formative evaluation 
and feedback
Across all SME panels, 43 unique controls were examined; 
of those 7 were examined by all three panels, resulting in 57 
patterns (36 + 21). Of the 57 identified patterns, our experi-
mental control identified 22 as performs, 30 as imposes, and 
5 as protects. For evaluation criteria E1, we compared our 
expectation in the control to our observations across the pan-
els. We found that 79% (45 of 57) of panel selected control 
patterns matched expectations—with SMEs identifying the 
same pattern type, level, and inputs as in our experimental 
control. All of the errors (12 of 57) involved SME panels 
erroneously identifying an imposes pattern as performs. This 
result led us to believe that there was a systemic ambiguity in 
the pattern selection process that made it difficult to distin-
guish between performs and imposes. Examining the misi-
dentified controls further, we found that they all used active 
verbs, such as “produces” as in NIST SC-12(2) which states:
The organization produces, controls, and distributes 
symmetric cryptographic keys using [Selection: NIST 
FIPS-compliant; NSA approved] key management 
technology and processes.
Although this control statement is imposing the use of 
a certain cryptographic key management process, panels 
interpreted the statement as a need for a particular system 
functionality to be performed (which was actually covered 
by the parent control, SC-12).
To address this issue and to make the application of 
imposes versus performs unambiguous, additional syn-
tax and applicability conditions were introduced into the 
imposes and performs patterns (as reflected in their ear-
lier definitions in Sects. 3.1 and 3.2). The change mainly 
focused on the use of the level as a distinguishing charac-
teristic. Specifically, performs was adjusted to only apply 
to the Info Sys or Comp levels, whereas imposes specifi-
cally only applies at the Org level. In post-experiment dis-
cussions with the panelists, this cleared up the ambiguity.
For evaluation criteria E2, our experimental control 
expected there to be 68 semantic relations across the pan-
els—or 10 subsumedBy, 31 refines, 10 usedBy, 7 struc-
tures, and 10 forms. By contrast, the SME panels collec-
tively identified 72 semantic relations, which decomposed 
to 13 subsumedBy, 24 refines, 16 usedBy, 7 structures, 
and 12 forms. Comparing each of the SME identified 72 
relations to our expected results, we observed 63 exact 
matches, i.e., the SME panel picked the same relation type, 
controls, and directionality as expected in the experimental 
control. This result translated to 92% (63 of 68) for evalu-
ation criteria E2, meaning 5 relations were omitted. Look-
ing closer at the omitted relations, 3 were structures and 2 
were subsumedBy. This observation meant that the other 
9 of the original 72 relations were extraneous. Five of 
the 9 extraneous relations were usedBy, suggesting a need 
to better clarify its semantics. Other extraneous relations 
included two instances of subsumedBy, and two structures. 
The results of analyzing the semantic relations led us to 
introduce additional text in each semantic relation section 
to clarify its formal usage. In addition, Table 1 was created 
to provide guidelines for the application of each relation 
type. Based on anecdotal post-study discussions with our 
SMEs, these changes reduced ambiguity and improved the 
accuracy and consistency of relationship identification.
Using the identification and authentication collection 
of 7 controls, which all panels examined, we calculated 
inter-rater reliability (evaluation criteria E4) and found 
it to be 71.4% across their application of the patterns and 
development of their hierarchies. According to the Lan-
dis and Koch-Kappa Most of the variances observed were 
in relation to the assignment of semantic relationships. 
The differences did not obstruct the creation of the hier-
archies or formation of verification constructs. Overall, 
the strongly positive pilot study results across E1 through 
E4, the feedback received from the participants, and the 
improvements made based on those discussions, suggested 
that the hierarchical modeling process can be consistently 
and reliably applied to produce the security profiles for use 
during verification.
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6.3  Second study methodology: summative 
assessment and evaluation
The larger study sought to replicate the pilot study results, 
as well as answer three additional research questions, stated 
below.
RQ4 How accurately do semantic hierarchies represent 
the underlying control requirements and are practitioners 
affected by confirmation bias when examining modeled 
control hierarchies?
RQ5 Is the semantic compliance modeling process under-
standable and easy to use by certification experts?
RQ6 Is the semantic compliance modeling process 
preferable to less formal approaches, such as DIACAP, 
among practitioners?
To address these questions, the study included three tasks 
as described below. All tasks were completed by five secu-
rity experts with compliance and certification backgrounds 
from industry that were familiar with the governance docu-
ments and who had obtained CNSSI certificates. Prior to 
the first task each subject matter expert was briefed on the 
extraction process and shown several examples of how the 
process is applied.
6.3.1  Task 1: Assessing modeling accuracy 
and confirmation bias
Task 1 addresses RQ4 and focuses on identifying how accu-
rately the model captures security requirements from the 
underlying controls and measures the amount of confirma-
tion bias SMEs may have when asked to evaluate pre-exist-
ing models for accuracy. Three specific evaluation criteria 
are defined for Task 1.
E5 The degree to which patterns accurately represent 
control requirements, from 1 (low) to 10 (high).
E6 The degree to which semantic relations accurately 
capture connections between controls, from 1 (low) to 
10 (high).
E7 What degree of confirmation bias is inherent in the 
assessment of E5 and E6?
To assess these criteria, each SME was presented with 
several collections of security controls that had been pre-
patterned following the semantic modeling process. They 
were asked to read through each of the controls (raw text 
from a regulatory document) and the pattern selected for the 
control and then rate each identified pattern on a scale from 
1 (poorly captures control requirements) to 10 (accurately 
captures requirements). The subjects were then presented 
with a fully modeled semantic hierarchy of the controls 
and asked to rate (on a scale from 1 to 10) how well they 
believed the semantic relation captured connections between 
the controls, based on the formal definitions of each relation 
and their understanding of how the compliance requirements 
were related. Lastly, each SME was asked whether or not 
they agreed with the selection of the dominant control for 
each hierarchy. To assess confirmation bias, an inaccurate 
hierarchy based on a grouping of controls with incorrect 
relations between them, was formed and given to the sub-
jects without their knowledge. The expectation was that 
SMEs would rate the accuracy of the incorrect hierarchies 
poorly, while rating the correct hierarchies highly. After the 
ratings were complete, we went over the findings with each 
subject and cleared any misconceptions to prepare them for 
the next evaluation task. A sample portion of the form used 
for assessment of Task 1 is provided in Fig. 17.
6.3.2  Task 2: Control pattern identification and inter‑rater 
reliability replication
Task 2 sought to replicate the inter-rater reliability data from 
the pilot study, adding support for criteria E4. In Task 2, the 
SMEs were presented with all four collections of controls 
that the other SMEs in the pilot study had received, i.e., 
the 43 controls identified in Table 2. SMEs were shown the 
control text for each control (as it appears in the regula-
tory document it originated from) and then asked to select 
the most appropriate pattern that fit it. A sample portion of 
the assessment form for Task 2 is provided in Fig. 18. The 
expectation was that SMEs would show a similar or better 
inter-rater reliability as observed in the pilot study.
6.3.3  Task 3: survey questions for ease of use 
and preference measurement
Task 3 sought to answer RQ5 and RQ6 through qualitative 
survey feedback regarding the ease of use and preference for 
the semantic modeling process over other approaches. Three 
evaluation criteria are defined below.
E8 How intuitive are control patterns for extracting 
requirements in governing documents?
E9 How intuitive are the semantic relations for connect-
ing controls together?
E10 Is the compliance modeling process preferable to 
informal certification approaches?
To address these criteria, Task 3 posed a number of 
survey questions to our SMEs. Where applicable a scale 
of 1 (bad) to 10 (good) was used. The following questions 
Q1–Q7 were included in the survey. A portion of the Task 
3 study form is shown in Fig. 19.
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Q1 How intuitive are the control patterns for extracting 
requirements in the governing documents?
Q2 How intuitive are the semantic relations for con-
necting controls together?
Q3 What about the extraction process is most difficult?
Q4 The patterns span all possible types of controls (i.e., 
ones not shown here).
Q5 (optional) If you disagreed, what types of patterns 
do you think are missing?
Q6 Extracted controls in a compliance hierarchy (the 
patterns and diagrams in task 1) are easier to understand 
than lists of un-extracted controls.
Q7 As a security engineer working to model the secu-
rity compliance of a system, I would rather use this 
process than a checklist like the DIACAP. 
6.4  Study two results: summative assessment 
and evaluation
The following sections examine the expert responses to 
the study in the context of each task and set of evaluation 
criteria.
Fig. 17  Sample portion of the assessment form for Task 1
Fig. 18  Sample portion of the assessment for Task 2
 Requirements Engineering
1 3
6.4.1  Assessing E5–E7 with task 1 results
In Task 1, the experts individually examined 61 security 
controls across control hierarchies in the overall compli-
ance model, with their associated patterned statements, as 
expressed in “Appendix”. Across all of the control hierar-
chies, the experts agreed with the dominant control selec-
tion 91% of the time (64 out of 70 individual assessments). 
Across all pattern types, the average accuracy rating of the 
control patterns was 9.34 (out of a possible 10) for the 305 
individual pattern accuracy ratings. This suggests, for E5, 
that the model accurately represented the underlying secu-
rity requirements. By pattern type, the average accuracy was 
9.00 (for protects with 25 individual accuracy assessments), 
9.34 (for performs with 100 assessments), and 9.39 (for 
imposes with 180 assessments) as determined by the experts.
Similarly, the experts assessed 68 semantic relations 
across all several hierarchies. The overall accuracy of all 
relation types was 9.26 across 340 individual relation accu-
racy ratings. By relation type, this decomposed to 9.51 (for 
forms 65 assessments), 8.90 (for structures 20 assessments), 
9.50 (for refines 90 assessments), 9.10 (for subsumedBy 150 
assessments), and 9.30 (for usedBy 20 assessments). This 
strongly suggests that experts agree with that the relation-
ships could capture connections between security controls.
With these results in mind, our observations regarding 
criteria E7, i.e., how prevalent was confirmation bias among 
the experts, was surprising. We found that their assessments 
of the incorrect hierarchy, both in terms pattern accuracy and 
relationship accuracy were much higher than expected (in 
the 7 s for patterns and 6 s for the semantic relations). While 
their overall accuracy ratings were lower than the real hier-
archies, the relatively high accuracy values provided show a 
strong confirmation bias. In other words, the security experts 
seemed to be inclined to believe whatever was put in front 
of them, if it was fully developed into a hierarchy. The spe-
cific incorrect hierarchy that duped the experts is shown in 
Fig. 20. This result means that the assessment results for E5 
and E6 are less credible and require additional validation. 
Thankfully, the results of Task 2 and its replication of E5, 
discussed in the next section, shed further light on E5 and 
E6 by assessing the internal consistency of experts select-
ing patterns when they are not provided preformed patterns.
6.4.2  Replicating internal consistency criteria E4 with Task 
2 Results
The Task 2 findings alleviated some of the concerning 
results of E7. Across the 5 experts, we found an overall 
internal consistency, i.e., experts picked the same control 
pattern, 67% of the time (with 215 individual assessments 
across 43 unique controls). This result decomposed to 71% 
internal consistency with selecting performs patterns (102 
agreements), 75% internal consistency when selecting pro-
tects patterns (34 agreements), and 64% internal consistency 
with imposes patterns (76 agreements). Evaluating their 
selections in the same context as E5 from the pilot study, 
we found that they picked the same control pattern type as 
the SMEs in the pilot study 64% of the time.
The raw data used to tabulate these results are presented 
in Table 3. All performs patterns are color-coded with blue, 
protects are shown in gold, imposes are shown in red, and 
no match is plain white. A control reference, including the 
name and location of the control text, is provided on the left 
side of Table 3. The right hand side of the table shows the 
highest degree of consistency across the different types. For 
instance, the highest consistency of the first row is 4, since 
4 of the 5 experts selected performs.
Overall these results bolster the results of E5 and E6 sug-
gesting that non-collaborating security experts select the 
Fig. 19  Sample portion of the assessment for Task 3
Fig. 20  Incorrect hierarchy with incorrect patterns and relationships
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same pattern about two-thirds of the time. In a real organiza-
tion, security experts would likely collaborate to ensure that 
everyone is on the same page and understands the informa-
tion consistently. To that degree, one of the experts that took 
part in the study, stated in the optional comment section, that 
they believed iterative refinement to be absolutely essen-
tial to the compliance assessment process, in this model, 
or any other. This anecdote when combined with the blind 
two-thirds internal consistency, and the inter-rater reliabil-
ity measured in the pilot study indicates that the process is 
relatively unambiguous and repeatable.
Another factor not discussed up to this point is the inher-
ent ambiguity present in the security controls themselves. 
For instance, from Table 3, one can see that controls relating 
to well understood topics like access control (the AC family) 
were much better understood than controls relating to system 
Table 3  Raw pattern assessment data for Task 2
Control (referrence) Expert 1 Expert 2 Expert 3 Expert 4 Expert 5 Highest Consistency
AC-3 (sp-800-53-rev4, page 163) Performs Performs Performs Performs Protects 4
AC-3(2) (sp-800-53-rev4, page 163) Performs Performs Performs Performs Performs 5
AC-3(5) (sp-800-53-rev4, page 165) Performs Performs Performs Performs Performs 5
AC-3(7) (sp-800-53-rev4, page 165) Performs Protects Performs Performs Imposes 3
AC-6 (sp-800-53-rev4, page 171) Imposes Imposes Imposes Imposes Performs 4
AC-6(2) (sp-800-53-rev4, page 172) Imposes Imposes Imposes Imposes Imposes 5
AC-14.a (sp-800-53-rev4, page 178) Imposes Imposes Imposes Imposes no match 4
FDP_ACC.2.1  (CC-Part2, page 57) Performs Imposes Performs Performs Imposes 3
FDP_ACF.1.1  (CC-Part2, page 59) Performs Imposes Performs Performs Imposes 3
FIA_UID.1.1  (CC-Part2, page 99) Performs Imposes Performs Performs no match 3
APS0110: CAT II (app-stig, page 26) Performs Imposes Imposes Imposes Protects 3
AC-2.d (sp-800-53-rev4, page 160) Imposes Imposes Imposes Imposes Performs 4
AC-2(1) (sp-800-53-rev4, page 161) Imposes Imposes Imposes Performs Performs 3
AC-2(8) (sp-800-53-rev4, page 162) Performs no match Performs Performs Performs 4
AC-2(2) (sp-800-53-rev4, page 162) Performs Protects Performs Performs Imposes 3
AC-2(3) (sp-800-53-rev4, page 162) Performs Protects Performs Performs Imposes 3
AC-2(5) (sp-800-53-rev4, page 162) Imposes Protects Imposes Imposes Imposes 4
AC-2(9) (sp-800-53-rev4, page 163) Imposes Performs Imposes Imposes Imposes 4
AC-2(10) (sp-800-53-rev4, page 163) Performs Protects Performs Performs Performs 4
APS0510: CAT II (app-stig page 21) Performs Performs Imposes Imposes Imposes 3
N/A CAT II (app-stig page 27) Performs Performs Imposes Imposes Imposes 3
N/A CAT II (app-stig page 27) Performs Performs Imposes Imposes Imposes 3
N/A CAT II (app-stig page 27) Performs Performs Imposes Imposes Imposes 3
N/A CAT II (app-stig page 27) Performs Performs Imposes Imposes Imposes 3
IA-2 (sp-800-53-rev4, page 243) Performs Protects Performs Performs Performs 4
IA-2(1) (sp-800-53-rev4, page 244) Performs Protects Performs Performs Protects 3
IA-3 (sp-800-53-rev4, page 246) Performs Protects Performs Performs Performs 4
IA-3(1) (sp-800-53-rev4, page 246) Performs Protects Performs Performs Performs 4
FIA_AFL.1.2 (CC-Part2, page 89) Performs Performs Performs Performs Imposes 4
FIA_UAU.2.1 (CC-Part2, page 96) Performs Performs Performs Imposes Imposes 3
FTA_MCS.1.1 (CC-Part2, page 164) Performs Imposes Performs Imposes Imposes 3
SC-8 (sp-800-53-rev4, page 346) Protects Protects Protects Performs Protects 4
SC-8(1) (sp-800-53-rev4, page 346) Protects Protects Performs Performs Protects 3
SC-12 (sp-800-53-rev4, page 348) Protects Protects Performs Performs Imposes 2
SC-12(2) (sp-800-53-rev4, page 348) Imposes Protects Imposes Performs Performs 2
SC-17 (sp-800-53-rev4, page 351) Imposes Protects Imposes Performs Performs 2
FCS_CKM.1.1 (CC-Part2, page 50) Protects Imposes Performs Performs Imposes 2
FCS_CKM.2.1 (CC-Part2, page 50) Protects Imposes Performs Performs Imposes 2
FPT_ITT.1.1 (CC-Part2, page 136) Protects Protects Protects Performs Protects 4
FPT_ITC.1.1 (CC-Part2, page 132) Protects Protects Protects Performs Protects 4
FPT_ITI.1.1 (CC-Part2, page 134) Performs Imposes Performs Imposes Imposes 3
N/A: CAT II (app-stig, page 26) Performs Imposes Performs Imposes Protects 2
APS0350: CAT I (app-stig, page 27) Performs Imposes Performs Imposes Performs 3
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and communication protections (SC family in the NIST) and 
protection of the TSF (FPT in the CC). This could mean that 
there are inherent ambiguities in the underlying documents 
that make the patterning process more difficult in the same 
way they would make compliance assessment in another pro-
cess more difficult. In other words, ambiguity in, ambiguity 
out.
6.4.3  Assessing E8–E10 with Task 3 results
Task 3 sought to obtain a sense of how the experts felt about 
the overall process in the context of other competing compli-
ance assessment processes, like DIACAP, for instance. To 
this degree, the experts were asked a series of general ques-
tions as discussed in Sect. 6.3.3. For Q1, i.e., “How intuitive 
are the control patterns for extracting requirements in the 
governing documents?”, the experts provided an average rat-
ing of 8.8 indicating intuitive to very intuitive. Q2, i.e., the 
same question, but about the semantic relations, received a 
slightly lower average rating of 8.2.
One of the experts, in the comments, specifically had 
trouble distinguishing between structures and refines. This 
led to additional feedback in the descriptions in Table 1 to 
better explain the guidelines for each. For Q3, i.e., what 
about the process is most difficult, the majority of experts 
selected the “determining which fields the control includes” 
option. This led us to review and adjust the language for 
pattern application to better express their parameters. Col-
lectively, Q1–Q5 indicated that the patterns and relation-
ships are intuitive for security experts, addressing E8 and 
E9 favorably.
Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, the study sought to 
determine if the security experts would prefer the compli-
ance modeling process to other less formal approaches like 
DIACAP. Anecdotally, in the comments sections, several of 
the experts expressed their interest in the ability of the model 
to capture and represent requirements succinctly. One expert 
pointed to the fact that the model would only actually need 
to be developed once, and then, it could be re-used later by 
any other organization.
Looking at the more numerical assessments, there were 
strong results toward E10 indicating that the model would 
be preferable over informal methods. Q6, asking the experts 
whether or not the compliance hierarchies are easier to 
understand than groups of unrelated controls, received an 
average rating of 9 across the experts indicating that they 
strongly agree. In the comments, two of the experts pointed 
to the graphical layout as providing an idea of structure that 
was not provided by DIACAP or other similar approaches. 
Similarly, Q7, which directly asked the experts if they 
would rather use the compliance hierarchy process over 
the DIACAP, received an average rating of 8.6 indicating a 
strong degree of agreement. Overall, the results of Tasks 1, 
2, and 3 suggest that the requirement extraction process is 
consistent and repeatable and that the resulting compliance 
model semantic hierarchy is desirable to industry security 
analysts.
7  Discussion and conclusion
The work presented in this paper describes a process that 
includes reusable patterns, model templates, and semantic 
relations to allow new or updated controls to be patterned, 
formalized, and related to other controls in a new, existing, 
or emerging control hierarchy. The design of a compliance 
model provides clarity to the certification process and facili-
tates its application to information systems by exploiting 
the connectivity not only between security controls within a 
single document, but also across governing documents. The 
end result of the application of the compliance model is a set 
of predicates that solidify compliance interpretations so that 
they can be used directly and extended or refined by other 
entities that rely on the governing security documents, such 
as FedRamp [74] and CSA [75] for cloud computing. By 
establishing a compliance modeling process, our model can 
be expanded to cover additional security areas of concern.
This paper also followed a running audit-related case 
study that derived and specified all audit-related predicates 
in the set of examined governing documents (NIST SP800-
53, etc.). The predicates specified here are thus reusable 
across environments, systems, and organizations utilizing 
those documents. Instantiating the overall compliance model 
given an organization and their information systems pro-
vides a structured certification baseline that can be used to 
formulate test cases, direct mitigation strategies, or specify 
the organization’s desired verification constructs. Once a 
document is extracted, and the resulting semantic hierar-
chy-based compliance model is verified, it can be re-used 
until the underlying security control texts are changed or 
extended—at which point the model can be updated. This 
approach provides a stable, reusable, graphic, and formaliz-
able certification baseline that can be used in conjunction 
with formal or informal accreditation processes for improved 
certification against control standards.
As NIST has now separated out the original privacy con-
trols from the general families and created a new, dedicated 
segment of the SP800-53r4 to only privacy related con-
trols, application of this research to those privacy controls 
is part of future effort. Another future effort is to examine 
the impact that constructed overlays have in clarifying cer-
tification needs by applying the controls within a specific 
domain. It is possible that the overlays that form the control 
sets could be “overlaid” onto the set of predicates to clarify 
how predicates can be directly instantiated.
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Appendix A: Study: control patterns for all 
audit‑related controls in the NIST SP 800‑53, 
DoDI8500.2, ISO 15408‑2, and related 
documents
Group: auditable events
AU-2.G.a: The organization determines, based on a risk 
assessment and mission/business needs, that the information 
system must be capable of auditing the following events: 
[Assignment: organization-defined list of auditable events].
Pattern:
Org imposes a set of auditable events on information 
systems
FAU_SEL.1.1: The TSF shall be able to select the set of 
audited events from the set of all auditable events based on 
the following attributes: a) [selection: object identity, user 
identity, subject identity, host identity, event type] b) [assign-
ment: list of additional attributes that audit selectivity is 
based upon].
Pattern:
Org imposes audit parameters (object_id, user_id, sub-
ject_id, host_id, event_type, and additional_content) 
on auditable events
FAU_GEN.1.1(b): The TSF shall be able to generate 
an audit record of all auditable events for the [selection, 
choose one of: minimum, basic, detailed, not specified] level 
of audit.
Pattern:
Org imposes audit levels as parameters (minimum, 
basic, detailed, not specified) on auditable events
APP3620: The Designer will ensure the application does 
not disclose unnecessary information to users.
Pattern:
Org imposes a secrecy level on system information
AU-2.E4: The organization includes execution of privi-
leged functions in the list of events to be audited by the 
information system.
Pattern:
Org imposes execution of privileged functions as a 
selected auditable event
APP3660: The Designer will ensure the application has 
a capability to notify the user on login of date and time of 
the user’s last unsuccessful logon, IP address of the user’s 
last unsuccessful logon, date and time of the user’s last suc-
cessful logon, IP address of the user’s last successful logon, 
and number of unsuccessful logon attempts since the last 
successful logon.
Pattern:
Org imposes use of login function as a selected audit-
able event with parameters (timestamp and IP address 
of last unsuccessful logon, timestamp and IP of last 
successful logon, number of unsuccessful logon 
attempts since last successful logon)
APP3680.1: The Designer will ensure the applica-
tion design includes audits on all access to need-to-know 
information.
Pattern:
Org imposes access control reads and writes as 
selected auditable events
APP3680.2: The Designer will ensure the application 
logs all failed access attempts to need-to-know information.
Pattern:
Org imposes access control read-fails and write-fails 
as selected auditable events
APP3670: The Designer will ensure the application has 
a capability to display the user’s time and date of the last 
change in data content.
Pattern:
Org imposes data modification or deletion as selected 
auditable events
APP3680.6: The Designer will ensure the application 
creates an audit trail for addition, deletion, or change of the 
confidentiality or integrity labels as designated by the infor-
mation owner.
Pattern:
Org imposes confidentiality and integrity label modi-
fication as selected auditable events
FAU_GEN.1.1(a): The TSF shall be able to generate an 
audit record of start-up and shutdown of the audit functions.
Pattern:
Org imposes data modification or deletion as selected 
auditable events
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Group: audit record
AU-3.G: The information system produces audit records that 
contain sufficient information to, at a minimum, establish 
what type of event occurred, when (date and time) the event 
occurred, where the event occurred, the source of the event, 
the outcome (success or failure) of the event, and the identity 
of any user/subject associated with the event.
Pattern:
Org imposes content parameters (type, timestamp, 
location, source, outcome, UID) on audit records
AU-3.E1: The information system includes [Assignment: 
organization-defined additional, more detailed information] 
in the audit records for audit events identified by type, loca-
tion, or subject.
Pattern:
Org imposes additional content on audit records
FAU_GEN.1.2: The TSF shall record within each audit 
record at least the following information: a) Date and time 
of the event, type of event, subject identity (if applicable), 
and the outcome (success or failure) of the event; and b) For 
each audit event type, based on the auditable event defini-
tions of the functional components included in the PP/ST, 
[assignment: other audit relevant information].
Pattern:
Org imposes content parameters (timestamp, location, 
source, outcome, UID) on audit records
ECAR-1: Audit records for MAC-1 include: user ID, date 
and time of the event, and the type of event.
Pattern:
Org imposes content parameters (type, timestamp, 
UID) on audit records
ECAR-2: Audit records for MAC-2 include: user ID, date 
and time of the event, type of event, success or failure of 
event, [and information needed to record defined auditable 
events—i.e. source].
Pattern:
Org imposes content parameters (type, timestamp, out-
come, UID, source) on audit records
ECAR-3: Audit records for MAC-3 events include: user 
ID, date and time of the event, type of event, success or 
failure of event [and information needed to record defined 
auditable events—i.e. source].
Pattern:
Org imposes content parameters (type, timestamp, out-
come, UID, source) on audit records
APP3680.3: The Designer will ensure the application’s 
publicly releasable data audit records include: user ID, date 
and time of the event, and the type of event.
Pattern:
Org imposes content parameters (type, timestamp, 
UID) on audit records
APP3680.4: The Designer will ensure the application’s 
sensitive data audit records include: user ID, date and time 
of the event, type of event, and the success or failure of 
event [and information needed to record defined auditable 
events—i.e. source].
Pattern:
Org imposes content parameters (type, timestamp, out-
come, UID, source) on audit records
APP3680.5: The Designer will ensure the application’s 
classified data audit records include: user ID, date and time 
of the event, type of event, success or failure of event [and 
information needed to record defined auditable events—i.e. 
source].
Pattern:
Org imposes content parameters (type, timestamp, out-
come, UID, source) on audit records
Group: audit record generation
AU-12.G.a: The information system provides audit record 
generation capability for the list of auditable events defined 
in AU-2 at [Assignment: organization-defined information 
system components].
Pattern:
InfoSys performs audit record generation given an 
auditable event occurs and parameters (set of declared 
auditable events and components (imposed by Org)) 
that results in audit record creation
AU-12.G.c: The information system generates audit 
records for the list of audited events defined in AU-2 with 
the content as defined in AU-3.
Pattern:
InfoSys performs audit record generation given an 
auditable event occurs and parameters (set of declared 
auditable events and components (imposed by Org)) 
that results in audit record creation
APP3640: The Designer will ensure the application sup-
ports the creation of transaction logs for access and changes 
to the data.
Pattern:
InfoSys performs audit record generation given an 
auditable event occurs and parameters (set of declared 
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auditable events and components (imposed by Org)) 
that results in audit record creation
FAU_GEN.1.1(c): The TSF shall be able to generate an 
audit record of the following auditable events [assignment: 
other specifically defined auditable events].
Pattern:
InfoSys performs audit record generation given an 
auditable event occurs and parameters (set of declared 
auditable events and components (imposed by Org)) 
that results in audit record creation
Group: audit trail compilation
AU-3.E2: The organization centrally manages the content 
of audit records generated by [Assignment: organization-
defined information system components].
Pattern:
Org imposes centrally managed content on select com-
ponents
AU-12.E1: The information system compiles audit 
records from [Assignment: organization-defined information 
system components] into a system-wide (logical or physi-
cal) audit trail that is time correlated to within [Assignment: 
organization-defined level of tolerance for relationship 
between time stamps of individual records in the audit trail].
Pattern:
InfoSys performs audit record compilation given com-
ponent audit record generation and parameter (list of 
components selected to be part of the trail) that results 
in production of a time correlated, system-wide audit 
trail
AU-12.E2: The information system produces a system-
wide (logical or physical) audit trail composed of audit 
records in a standardized format.
Pattern:
InfoSys performs audit record conversion given un-
standardized audit records and parameters (list of com-
ponents selected to be part of the audit trail, standard 
format) that results in audit records being in a standard 
format
Group: non‑repudiation
AU-10.G: The information system protects against an indi-
vidual falsely denying having performed a particular action.
Pertinent Supplemental Guidance Non-repudiation 
services are obtained by employing various techniques 
or mechanisms (e.g., digital signatures, digital message 
receipts).
Pattern:
InfoSys protects user action logs using digital signa-
ture mechanisms (imposed by org) to prevent repudia-
tion
AU-10.E1: The information system associates the identity 
of the information producer with the information.
Pattern:
InfoSys performs identity (UID) binding given audit 
record generation and parameters (audit record, user, 
binding mechanism) that results in a signed UID in 
the audit record
AU-10.E2: The information system validates the 
binding of the information producer’s identity to the 
information.
Pertinent Supplemental Guidance This control enhance-
ment is intended to mitigate the risk that information is 
modified between production and review. The validation 
of bindings can be achieved, for example, by the use of 
cryptographic checksums.
Pattern:
InfoSys performs binding validation given audit 
record review and parameter (validation mechanism) 
that results in UID validation
AU-10.E3: The information system maintains reviewer/
releaser identity and credentials within the established 
chain of custody for all information reviewed or released.
Pertinent Supplemental Guidance If the reviewer is a 
human or if the review function is automated but separate 
from the release/transfer function, the information system 
associates the identity of the reviewer of the information to 
be released with the information and the information label.
Pattern:
InfoSys performs reviewer identity binding given 
audit record review and parameters (audit record, 
user, binding mechanism) that results in signed 
reviewer UID in the audit record
AU-10.E4: The information system validates the bind-
ing of the reviewer’s identity to the information at the 
transfer/release point prior to release/transfer from one 
security domain to another security domain.
Pattern:
InfoSys performs binding validation given audit 
record transfer and parameter (audit record, valida-
tion mechanism) that results in UID validation
FAU_GEN.2.1 For audit events resulting from actions 
of identified users, the TSF shall be able to associate each 
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auditable event with the identity of the user that caused 
the event.
Pattern:
InfoSys performs identity (UID) binding given audit 
record generation and parameters (audit record, user, 
binding mechanism) that results in a signed UID in 
the audit record
Group: audit failure system
AU-5.G.a: The information system alerts designated organi-
zational officials in the event of an audit processing failure.
Pattern:
Org performs a set of audit failure actions related to 
audit failure events
AU-5.G.b: The information system takes the following 
additional actions (in the event of an audit processing fail-
ure): [Assignment: organization-defined actions to be taken 
(e.g., shut down information system, overwrite oldest audit 
records, stop generating audit records)].
Pattern:
Org imposes additional actions related to audit failure 
events
AU-5.E1: The information system provides a warning 
when allocated audit record storage volume reaches [Assign-
ment: organization-defined percentage] of maximum audit 
record storage capacity.
Pattern:
Org imposes the percentage of audit record storage 
capacity which, when reached, causes a “warning 
action”
AU-5.E2: The information system provides a real-time 
alert when the following audit failure events occur: [Assign-
ment: organization-defined audit failure events requiring 
real-time alerts].
Pattern:
Org imposes select failure events which cause real-
time alert actions
AU-5.E3: The information system enforces configurable 
traffic volume thresholds representing auditing capacity for 
network traffic and [Selection: rejects or delays] network 
traffic above those thresholds.
Pattern:
Org imposes configurable traffic volume thresholds 
for auditing capacity of network traffic which, when 
reached, causes a reject or delay action
AU-5.E4: The information system invokes a system shut-
down in the event of an audit failure, unless an alternative 
audit capability exists.
Pattern:
Org imposes a system shutdown action for audit failure 
events without alternative audit capability
FAU_STG.3.1: The TSF shall [assignment: actions to be 
taken in case of possible audit storage failure] if the audit 
trail exceeds [assignment: pre-defined limit].
Pattern:
Org imposes selected actions to be applied when the 
audit trail exceeds a pre-defined limit
FAU_STG.4.1: The TSF shall [selection, choose one of: 
“ignore audited events”, “prevent audited events, except 
those taken by the authorised user with special rights”, 
“overwrite the oldest stored audit records”] and [assign-
ment: other actions to be taken in case of audit storage fail-
ure] if the audit trail is full.
Pattern:
Org imposes ignore, prevent and overwrite actions to 
be applied when the audit trail is full
APP3650: The Designer will ensure the application has 
a capability to notify an administrator when audit logs are 
nearing capacity as specified in the system documentation.
Pattern:
Org imposes the percentage of audit record storage 
capacity which, when reached, causes a “warning 
action”
Group: audit protection
AU-9.G: The information system protects audit information 
and audit tools from unauthorized access, modification, and 
deletion.
Pertinent Supplemental Guidance Audit information 
includes all information (e.g., audit records, audit settings, 
and audit reports) needed to successfully audit information 
system activity.
Pattern:
InfoSys protects audit records, the audit trail, auditable 
event definitions, and audit review tools using {} to 
prevent unauthorized access, modification or deletion
APP3690.4: The IAO will ensure the audit trail is pro-
tected against modification or deletion except by application 
administrators and auditors.
Pattern:
InfoSys protects the audit trail using {} to prevent 
modification or deletion
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APP3690.2: The Designer will ensure the audit trail is 
protected against modification or deletion except by applica-
tion administrators and auditors.
Pattern:
InfoSys protects the audit trail using {} to prevent 
modification or deletion
ECTP-1: The contents of audit trails are protected against 
unauthorized access, modification or deletion.
Pattern:
InfoSys protects the audit trail using {} to prevent 
unauthorized access, modification, or deletion
FAU_SAR.2.1: The TSF shall prohibit all users read 
access to the audit records, except those users that have been 
granted explicit read-access.
Pattern:
InfoSys protects audit records using {} to prevent 
unauthorized access
FAU_STG.1.1: The TSF shall protect the stored audit 
records in the audit trail from unauthorized deletion.
Pattern:
InfoSys protects the audit trail using {} to prevent 
unauthorized deletion
FAU_STG.1.2: The TSF shall be able to [selection, 
choose one of: prevent, detect] unauthorized modifications 
to the stored audit records in the audit trail.
Pattern:
InfoSys protects the audit trail using {} to prevent 
unauthorized modification
FAU_STG.2.1 The TSF shall protect the stored audit 
records in the audit trail from unauthorized deletion.
Pattern:
InfoSys protects the audit trail using {} to prevent 
unauthorized deletion
FAU_STG.2.2 The TSF shall be able to [selection, choose 
one of: prevent, detect] unauthorized modifications to the 
stored audit records in the audit trail.
Pattern:
InfoSys protects the audit trail using {} to prevent 
unauthorized modification
Group: audit access control
AC-3.E3: The information system enforces [Assignment: 
organization-defined nondiscretionary access control poli-
cies] over [Assignment: organization-defined set of users and 
resources] where the policy rule set for each policy specifies: 
(a) Access control information (i.e., attributes) employed 
by the policy rule set (e.g., position, nationality, age, pro-
ject, time of day); and (b) Required relationships among the 
access control information to permit access.
Pattern:
InfoSys performs access control enforcement given 
user access to assets or functions and org-defined 
access control policy parameters (position, national-
ity, age, project, time of day, relationships between 
information) that results in acceptance or rejectance 
of user access
AU-9.E4: The organization: a) authorizes access to man-
agement of audit functionality to only a limited subset of 
privileged users; and b) protects the audit records of non-
local accesses to privileged accounts and the execution of 
privileged functions.
Pattern:
Org imposes an access control list that specifies users 
authorized to access audit parameters (records, trail, 
tools).
FAU_SAR.1.1: The TSF shall provide [assignment: 
authorised users] with the capability to read [assignment: 
list of audit information] from the audit records.
Pattern:
Org imposes an access control list that specifies users 
authorized to access audit parameters (records).
APP3690.1: The Designer will ensure the audit trail is 
readable only by the application administrators and auditors.
Pattern:
Org imposes an access control list that specifies users 
authorized to access audit parameters (trail).
APP3690.3: The IAO will ensure the audit trail is read-
able only by application administrators and auditors.
Pattern:
Org imposes an access control list that specifies users 
authorized to access audit parameters (trail).
Group: audit cryptography
AU-9.E3: The information system uses cryptographic mech-
anisms to protect the integrity of audit information and audit 
tools.
Pertinent Supplemental Guidance An example of a cryp-
tographic mechanism for the protection of integrity is the 
computation and application of a cryptographic-signed hash 
using asymmetric cryptography, protecting the confidential-
ity of the key used to generate the hash, and using the public 
key to verify the hash information.
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Pattern:
InfoSys per forms  encryption given  audit 
information(records, trail) modification and defined 
cryptographic mechanisms(imposed by org) that 
results in encrypted audit information
DCNR-1.b: NIST FIPS 140-2 validated cryptogra-
phy (e.g., DoD PKI class 3 or 4 token) is used to imple-
ment encryption (e.g., AES, 3DES, DES, Skipjack), key 
exchange (e.g., FIPS 171), digital signature (e.g., DSA, 
RSA, ECDSA), and hash (e.g., SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-
384, SHA-512). Newer standards should be applied as they 
become available.
Pattern:
Org imposes the encryption mechanisms for the sys-
tems as: encryption: selection(AES, 3DES, DES, 
Skipjack); key exchange: selection(FIPS 171); digi-
tal signatures: selection(DSA, RSA, ECDSA); hash: 
selection(SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512)
AU-10.E5 The organization employs [Selection: FIPS-
validated; NSA-approved] cryptography to implement digi-
tal signatures.
Pattern:
Org imposes the encryption mechanisms for digital 
signatures: selection(FIPS-validated, NSA-approved);
Group: audit review
FAU_SAR.3.1: The TSF shall provide the ability to apply 
[assignment: methods of selection and/or ordering] of audit 
data based on [assignment: criteria with logical relations].
Pattern:
InfoSys performs audit reduction and report genera-
tion given parameter (audit trail, selection/ordering 
method, selection criteria) that results in the creation 
of an audit report
AU-7.G: The information system provides an audit reduc-
tion and report generation capability
Pattern:
InfoSys performs audit reduction and report generation 
given parameter (audit trail) that results in the produc-
tion of an audit report
AU-7.E1: The information system provides the capability 
to automatically process audit records for events of interest 
based on selectable event criteria.
Pattern:
InfoSys performs audit reduction and report genera-
tion given parameter (audit trail, selection criteria) that 
results in the production of an audit report
ECRG-1: Tools are available for the review of audit 
records and for report generation from audit records.
Pattern:
InfoSys performs audit report generation given param-
eter (audit trail) that results in the production of an 
audit report
FAU_SAR.1.2: The TSF shall provide the audit 
records in a manner suitable for the user to interpret the 
information.
Pattern:
Org imposes human readable qualities on generated 
audit reports
Group: audit record backup
AU-9.E2: The information system backs up audit records 
[Assignment: organization-defined frequency] onto a differ-
ent system or media than the system being audited.
Pattern:
InfoSys performs audit record backup given the backup 
frequency (imposed by the Org) and parameter (audit 
trail) that results in the creation of an audit records 
backup on a different system or media
ECTB-1: The audit records are backed up not less than 
weekly onto a different system or media than the system 
being audited.
Pattern:
InfoSys performs audit record backup given the backup 
frequency (no less than weekly) and parameter (audit 
trail) that results in the creation of an audit records 
backup on a different system or media
Group: audit user accounts (incorrect grouping, 
methodological control)
AC-2.d: The organization specifies authorized users of 
the information system, group and role membership, and 
access authorizations (i.e., privileges) and other attributes 
(as required) for each account.
Pattern:
Org imposes organizational and individual access con-
trol parameters on user accounts
AC-3.E2: The information system enforces dual authori-
zation for [Assignment: organization-defined privileged 
commands and/or other organization-defined actions].
Pattern:
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InfoSys performs dual authorization given privileged 
functions and actions that results in user login.
AC-3.E7: The information system enforces a role-based 
access control policy over defined subjects and objects and 
controls access based upon [Assignment: organization-
defined roles and users authorized to assume such roles].
Pattern:
Org imposes role-based access control policy on sub-
jects
AC-2.E3: The information system automatically disables 
inactive accounts after [Assignment: organization-defined 
time period].
Pattern: (wrong should be performs)
Org imposes inactive account disabling
AC-2.E5: The organization requires that users log out 
when [Assignment: organization-defined time-period of 
expected inactivity or description of when to log out].
Pattern: (wrong should be imposes)
InfoSys performs user log out given inactive time 
period that results in log out.
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